Corruption in public procurement \u2013 risks and reform policies by Pashev, Konstantin et al.
CORRUPTION IN PUBLIC 
PROCUREMENT
RISKS AND REFORM POLICIES
 
  Konstantin Pashev
  Assen Dyulgerov





 1. Bulgaria’s Participation in EU Structural Funds, Sofia, 1999.
  ISBN 954-477-050-8
 2. Social Policy Aspects of Bulgaria’s EU Accession, Sofia, 1999.
  ISBN 954-477-053-4
 3. Preparing for EU Accession Negotiations, Sofia, 1999.
  ISBN 954-477-055-7
 4. The Role of Political Parties in Accession to the EU, Sofia, 1999.
  ISBN 954-477-055-0
 5. Bulgaria’s Capital Markets in the Context of EU Accession: A Status Report, Sofia, 1999.
  ISBN 954-477-059-3
 6. Corruption and Trafficking: Monitoring and Prevention, Sofia, 2000.
  ISBN 954-477-078-X
 7. Establishing Corporate Governance in an Emerging Market: Bulgaria, Sofia, 2000. 
  ISBN 954-477-084-4
 9. Corruption and Illegal Trafficking: Monitoring and Prevention, Second, revised and 
  amended edition, Sofia, 2000.
  ISBN 954-477-087-9
 10. Smuggling in Southeast Europe, Sofia, 2002.
  ISBN 954-477-099-2
 11. Corruption, Trafficking and Institutional Reform, Sofia, 2002.
  ISBN 954-477-101-8
 12. The Drug Market in Bulgaria, Sofia, 2003.
  ISBN 954-477-111-5
 13. Partners in Crime: The Risks of Symbiosis between the Security Sector and 
  Organized Crime in Southeast Europe, Sofia, 2004. 
  ISBN 954-477-115-8
 14. Weapons under Scrutiny: Implementing Arms Export Controls and Combating Small Arms 
  Proliferation in Bulgaria, Sofia, 2004.
  ISBN 954-477-117-470
 15. Transportation, Smuggling and Organized Crime, Sofia, 2004.
  ISBN 954-477-119-0
 16. Corruption and Tax Compliance. Challenges to Tax Policy and Administration, Sofia, 2005. 
  ISBN 954-477-132-8
 17. Police Stops and Ethnic Profiling in Bulgaria, Sofia, 2006. 
  ISBN-10 954-477-142-5
  ISBN-13 978-954-477-142-3            
18. Corruption in Public Procurement. Risks and Reform Policies, 2006.
  ISBN-987-954-477-149-2
Editorial Board
  Ognian Shentov
  Boyko Todorov
  Alexander Stoyanov
 ISBN-987-954-477-149-2
©  2006 Center for the Study of Democracy
  All rights reserved.
  5 Alexander Zhendov Str. 1113 Sofia
  phone: (+359 2) 971 3000




INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1. PUBLIC PROCUREMENT: 
 A DRIVING FORCE AND INSTRUMENT OF POLITICAL CORRUPTION . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
 1.1. POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CORRUPTION IN PUBLIC PROCUREMENT  . . . . . . . . . . 9 
 1.2. RESPONSIBILITY: POLITICAL OR ADMINISTRATIVE, COLLECTIVE OR INDIVIDUAL  . . . . 14
2. CORRUPTION RISK AND CORRUPT PRACTICES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
 2.1. THE PUBLIC PROCUREMENT MARKET . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
 2.2. LEVEL AND SPREAD OF PUBLIC PROCUREMENT CORRUPTION . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
 2.3. THE COST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
 2.4. AREAS OF INCREASED CORRUPTION RISK IN THE PUBLIC PROCUREMENT SECTOR . . 30
3. THE ENERGY SECTOR – A SECTOR OF HIGH CORRUPTION RISK . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
 3.1. SOURCES OF CORRUPTION RISK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
 3.2. PUBLIC PROCUREMENT IN THE ENERGY SECTOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 
 3.3. FORMS OF ABUSE  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
 3.4. ABUSE IN THE CONSULTING AND INTERMEDIARY SERVICES IN 
  THE ENERGY SECTOR  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
 3.5. ANTI-CORRUPTION MEASURES IN PUBLIC PROCUREMENT IN 
  THE ENERGY SECTOR  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
 4. REDUCTION OF THE CORRUPTION RISK IN PUBLIC PROCUREMENT – 
  BALANCING ECONOMIC AND ENFORCEMENT POLICIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
 4.1. PROMOTING COMPETITION AND TRANSPARENCY  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
 4.2. E-TENDERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
 4.3. LEGAL REMEDIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
 4.4. CONTROL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
 4.5. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONTRACTS  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
 4.6. MONITORING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
 4.7. EFFECTIVE SANCTIONS AGAINST ABUSE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
 4.8. STRENGTHENING OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
 4.9. REGULATION OF THE FINANCING OF POLITICAL PARTIES, LOBBYING AND 
  PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
APPENDIX 1 LARGEST PUBLIC PROCUREMENT CONTRACTING
 AUTHORITIES IN TERMS OF AMOUNT OF THE SIGNED CONTRACTS 
 (10/2004 – 06/2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
APPENDIX 2 MAJOR PUBLIC PROCUREMENT CONTRACTING AUTHORITIES IN 
 THE ENERGY SECTOR (1 OCTOBER 2004 – 30 JUNE 2006)  . . . . 83




Public procurement is among those spheres in the management of the public 
sector in Bulgaria which are characterized by the highest corruption risk. 
Generally speaking, the abuses in this sphere relate to the awarding of a public 
procurement contract to a pre-selected supplier to the detriment of the public 
interest through violation of the principles of competition for the purpose of 
gaining personal benefit. 
Corruption in public procurement can hardly be put into the neat subdivisions 
of the conventional dichotomy of big and small corruption. The public sector 
purchases goods and services at all levels in various volumes and at different 
value of the supplies, starting from paper clips and other office materials to 
infrastructure projects. The favoritism with regard to a specific supplier, which 
is harmful to the public interest, can be observed anywhere from the smallest 
day-to-day supplies to the biggest tendering procedures directly supervised and 
controlled by senior government officials. The personal benefit can take the form 
of cash, power, jobs in the private or public sector, etc.  
This study focuses on large-scale corruption in the public procurement field with 
the goal to fine-tune the policy tools used to minimize the level of corruption. 
This type of corruption covers all transactions and procedures which fall or 
should fall within the scope of the public procurement legislation. These are 
most of the supplies the price or qualitative parameters of which are subject 
to negotiation between the contracting authorities in the public sector and the 
suppliers from the private sector. Exceptions to this rule are the supplies of 
consumables, materials or services which are only occasional and cannot possibly 
be subject to budget planning in parameters that would make it possible to 
conclude framework agreements for larger volumes. Such consumption of goods 
and services in the public sector, which cannot be planned and aggregated 
for the purpose of economic benefit, should be rather limited. It is below the 
thresholds prescribed by the law for holding public procurement procedures. 
However, when this direct off-the-shelf consumption is to intentionally circumvent 
the legislation, even small-scale purchases (below the statutory thresholds which 
require transparent procedures) could provide personal benefit to the lower levels 
of the administration in this particular case.
 
Despite the existence of corruption risk at all levels of government, this paper is 
interested in the abuse in public procurement mainly as the objective and tool 
of large-scale corruption. Two aspects of the problem can be identified. The first 
is the economic one. It is related to the economic and fiscal cost of the abuse, 
as well as to the respective institutional prerequisites and barriers in the system 
applied to the management of public spending. In this context, the emphasis is 
placed on the losses sustained by society from the negotiated supply of goods 
and services to the public sector under terms and conditions which are worse 
than the market ones, i.e. either at higher prices than the market levels or of 
inferior quality. This is a case of inefficient use of public funds, where decision-
makers receive undue personal benefit. In brief, this is the most logical question 
that any taxpayer would ask him/herself in order to assess the actions of those 
who manage public resources. If they were buying the respective good or service 
for themselves, would they accept the same terms and conditions? This question 
synthesizes the logic of the economic efficiency criteria in public procurement. 
It comes down to the principles of expediency in the control and counteraction 
of corruption in this sphere.
The second aspect of the problem is a legal one. It is related to the issue of 
what regulatory barriers could stop such actions and make them illegal and to 
what extent they are applied effectively. The emphasis here is on the statutory 
checks and balances and the application of the principles of legality. However, 
one cannot always seek the administrative responsibility or penal liability of 
decision-makers for purchasing under unfavourable terms and conditions. In 
many cases they harm public interests without breaking the law. Such examples 
can be seen at all levels of contracting - from the purchase of office materials 
to the purchase of nuclear reactors. This has recently become the reason for 
the emphasis to shift from the efforts aimed exclusively at improvement of 
the legal framework to control over the expediency of the actions of budget 
spending units. The big challenge here is that legality is established in adversarial 
court proceedings according to clear-cut codified rules, while expediency is a 
more amorphous category with less clearly defined rules and therefore it is more 
exposed to the threat of administrative discretion.    
This study is intended to build a bridge between the economic and legal levers 
to counteract corruption in public procurement. Regardless of whether there is 
a violation of the existing regulations, the contracting authority has restricted 
competition in one way or another, which has harmed the public interest 
in terms of the price and quality of the respective public services or goods. 
Precisely this opportunity for suppliers to compete in public procurement serves 
as the point of departure for the review of the legal framework in this sphere in 
Bulgaria. It is also the main criterion applied to the assessment of the corruption 
risk and the relevant anti-corruption measures.
In this context, the task to bring together the economic and legal tools in 
combating corruption in public procurement can be expressed as an answer to 
the following question: if the objective is to ensure as much free and fair 
competition as possible in public procurement, what is the institutional and 
regulatory framework for its attainment, which is optimal from the economic 
perspective?
The goal of the analysis is, first and foremost, to identify the normative and 
institutional prerequisites for the most common corrupt practices in public 
procurement and to suggest anti-corruption measures. Furthermore, it expands 
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the conventional approach in two aspects. First, it emphasizes the economic 
assessment of the effect of regulations and, second, it directs risk assessment and 
control to use objective expediency criteria. Chapter 1 outlines corruption in 
the public procurement as a main driving force and tool of political corruption. 
Chapter 2 presents the most common corrupt practices and abuses in Bulgaria 
and tries to give an approximate estimate of the magnitude of the phenomenon 
and the damage it causes. Chapter 3 focuses on the sectoral dimension of the 
problem based on the example of a sector with one of the highest corruption 
risks, i.e. energy. Chapter 4 connects the economic and legal aspects of the 
prevention of corruption and financial abuse in the public procurement sector. 
It contains a critical analysis of the way in which the anti-corruption policy and 
institutions have faced these challenges so far. The chapter traces out and reviews 
the structural reforms in the public procurement sphere in the light of the EU 
accession process, the changes in the Bulgarian legislation and administrative 
practices, as well as the control over the implementation of contracts. The 
conclusion summarizes the main findings and suggestions with regard to the anti-
corruption policy. 
The authors of the individual sections are as follows: Chapters 1 and 2 – 
Konstantin Pashev; Chapter 3 – Assen Dyulgerov and Georgi Kaschiev; Chapter 4 
– Konstantin Pashev and Assen Dyulgerov.1 Vesela Georgieva from the Center for 
the Study of Democracy has rendered valuable technical assistance.
 
The Center for the Study of Democracy would like to thank Milana Krivatchka, 
Senior Adviser, Council of Ministers, Miglena Pavlova, Executive Director, and 
Anna Mitkova, Electronic Database Director at the Public Procurement Agency for 
their assistance and Prof. Valeri Dimitrov, President of the National Audit Office, 
Petko Nikolov, Chairman of the Commission for the Protection of Competition, 
and Ginka Draganinska, Executive Director of the Public Financial Inspection 
Agency for their valuable comments and input into the earlier versions of this 
study.
1 Konstantin Pashev is a PhD holder in Economics, Associate Professor in the Economics 
of the Public Sector, and Senior Economist at the Center for the Study of Democracy; 
Assen Dyulgerov is a practicing lawyer; Georgi Kaschiev is a PhD holder in reactor physics, 
lecturer and researcher at the Institute for Risk Research of the University of Vienna. 

1. PUBLIC PROCUREMENT:  A DRIVING FORCE AND INSTRUMENT  
      OF POLITICAL CORRUPTION
     
1.1. POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CORRUPTION IN PUBLIC PROCUREMENT 
As varied as they are, abuses in the area of public procurement aim at re-
directing financial resources from public spending units and state-owned or 
municipal enterprises to the private benefit of individuals who are responsible for 
procurement decisions. Corruption in public procurement could be seen through 
two supplementing economic models. The first one is the principal-agent model. 
It explains the opportunities for gaining private benefit by disposing of taxpayers’ 
money. Budget spending management in modern democratic systems implies the 
delegation of rights and responsibilities from the citizens (the principal) to the 
elected politicians (the agent) and even to deeper levels of the political structure. 
Here the mandate is not fully specified. Decision-makers have some discretionary 
powers because voters cannot predict all the decisions of politicians and senior 
officials concerning public spending in the election process. Voters can only 
demand from them to keep up with their programs and promises and to hold 
them accountable based on the results.
This mandate is not only incomplete; it is also very heterogeneous. It is a projection 
of the choice made by the general public, striking a balance between different 
social interests and views on public spending. In short, the incompleteness and 
heterogeneity of the mandate are incentives for the mandate holder (the agent) 
to deviate from it.  
Within the framework of this conceptual construct, the measures to counteract 
abuses in the management of budget spending are primarily related to making the 
mandate more specific, i.e. providing the details with regard to the responsibilities 
of contracting authorities in the public procurement process and reducing the 
scope of administrative discretionary powers in the contract awarding process. The 
tendency to ensure detailed and comprehensive regulation of these procedures 
and the emphasis laid on lawfulness in the control phase have been the 
manifestations of this logic so far. But the mandate can be made more specific 
also by clearer definition of the objectives to be attained. This is the rationale 
underlying the increased relative share of expediency criteria at the expense 
of the narrower lawfulness criteria prevailing so far in the assessment and control 
of public procurement. This transition is largely the key to the synthesis of the 
legal and economic levers of the anti-corruption policy in the public procurement 
sphere.
The second conceptual approach to curbing corruption in public procurement 
builds on the classical individual behavioral model to explain and counteract crime 
in general. It explains the individual motivation for the use of opportunities for 
the extraction of private benefit (formulated above in the principal-agent model). 
The classic individual behavioral model stems from the expected personal benefit 
and the individual price that the perpetrator expects to pay, depending on the 
likelihood of detection and punishment. Hence, counteracting measures are most 
likely to be effective, are to be done at the level of individual incentives and 
disincentives concerning the corrupt interaction between the bribing party and 
the bribed party. They relate to the opportunities to detect, prove and punish 
the abuse which, in turn, correlates with the efficiency of the internal financial 
control system and the judiciary.
Corruption in the public procurement has its specific drives and brakes, putting 
the two anti-corruption models described above in a different light. What makes 
it different from the other types of fiscal corruption is the fact that it largely 
determines the objectives and tools of political clientelism. The mechanism 
is all too familiar. Like everywhere else in the world, political parties need the 
financial support of the business community for their electoral campaigns. Unlike 
in developed democracies, however, in the Bulgarian practices this support is 
considered as a business investment not to the benefit of the public but as a 
private investment of the respective sponsoring business in exchange of which the 
return is guaranteed in the form of privileges and benefits in the distribution of 
the public good once the sponsored party or “independent” candidate comes to 
power. This means privileged access to public procurement contracts, concession 
agreements and other forms of directing public resources into private accounts. 
Of course, part of these resources end up in the private accounts of those who 
make the decisions or exercise political control. This is not at the expense of the 
contractors; it is at the expense of taxpayers. Without competition, suppliers can 
always internalize the costs incurred for private incentives in the price of their 
supplies. Figure 1 illustrates, in principle, the cycle of such political “investment”. 
The sponsoring business supports the electoral campaign of its political ally. 
The objective of the sponsorship is victory in the elections, i.e. the conversion 
of money into votes. The business receives a return on its investment (M’) 
through public procurement contracts awarded by those in government while the 
responsible officials get their personal benefit (M”).   
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Except for the final stage M”, this scheme was openly defended and justified 
in a series of public statements of the MRF leader Ahmed Dogan in 2005 
and 2006. Its ideological rationale is that by supporting their business sponsors 
political parties create jobs in their constituencies and enhance the standards of 
living of their voters. Insofar as all parties have their constellations or “loops” of 
businesses, society does not lose anything in the end. According to Mr. Dogan, 
parties compete for the interest of their members and that of society as a whole 
through their loops of businesses.2 The problem with this conceptual scheme for 
legitimization of party-related loops of businesses is that it makes the market 
economy redundant to a great extent. One can ask the following question: 
why are market competition and transaction costs necessary if political parties 
can so efficiently allocate the scarce resources in the economy through political 
competition?
The above illustration is too schematic to fully reflect the whole diversity of the 
process. Unlike ordinary investments, political ones are associated with greater 
risks and uncertainty. They arise from the uncertain outcome of the political 
competition, the uncertain outcome of the campaign, as well as from the 
balance of forces within the supported party and hence the relative weight of 
the commitments to other sponsors. Furthermore, the financial parameters of the 
investment are clear enough, unlike its rate of return. What is paid for before 
the elections is the membership fee for the club of those who stand close to the 
government but the benefit from that membership is determined later on as the 
price of additional payments which might go to the officials in charge rather than 
directly to the political party. Besides, as major as it is, public procurement is only 
one element of the benefits from the membership of the club. The others might 
be related to concession arrangements, subcontracting for foreign contractors, 
issuance of licenses and permits for various activities and transactions, political 
shielding of the circumvention of the law, government posts abroad which are 
important for the business, and so forth.  














2 See Report of the MRF Chairman, Dr. Ahmed Dogan before the Delegates and Guests of the Sixth 
MRF National Conference, 1 April 2006; available online at: http://www.dps.bg/cgi-bin/e-cms/
vis/vis.pl?s=001&p=0037&n=000001& 
On the other hand, we can hardly put all the business partners of those in 
government under the same common denominator. Most of them compete for 
a membership in the club and their costs of avoiding risks during the electoral 
campaign are the greatest. Others, being companies owned by the party leaders 
or functionaries themselves join automatically. They do not need to make any 
investment in the party. Conversely, parties and other sponsors invest in them, 
involving them as partners, consultants or subcontractors for their supplies. Still 
others are so closely identified with a specific political party that their business 
cycle largely reflects the life cycle of the party. There is also the group of those 
who have managed to outgrow their initial one-party affiliation and are now 
big enough to expect membership in any club, i.e. their money is welcome 
everywhere even at a later stage when the risks and uncertainty are reduced.
The level of government matters as well. In the case of local government, the 
smaller the municipality, the less the uncertainty and hence the greater the 
opportunities for local businesses to determine the membership and decisions 
of the municipal leadership. Of course, it is the objective of each business to 
expand and go beyond the boundaries of the region. Therefore, businesses 
need to invest in the central government, members of parliament, and senior 
government officials. Even further, the division of the public resources which 
takes place at the local level is still relatively small due to the incomplete fiscal 
decentralization in the country.
Large-scale corruption in Bulgaria underwent several stages during the country’s 
transition to a market economy. In the early 1990’s, when democracy and the 
rule of law were quite fragile, political corruption was mainly in the form of 
pumping resources out of the state-owned enterprises and their preparation for 
cheap privatization. The newly established private businesses stood at the input 
and output of state-owned enterprises with the participation of the management 
of the latter. Against the backdrop of the underdeveloped market economy 
and the price liberalization, they got the opportunity to bleed state-owned 
enterprises out and the state budget thanks to the soft budget constraints prior 
to the introduction of the currency board arrangements. Thus, the economic 
shock-therapy and financial liberalization of the early 1990’s, together with the 
delayed structural reforms and the soft budget constraints, created opportunities 
for channeling assets of the public sector to privileged private groups. After the 
crisis in 1996-7 and the introduction of the currency board, those structures 
which were the main factor for the delay of the reform processes turned into 
major participants in the privatization. That process created the specific Bulgarian 
features of what the World Bank experts called “state capture”.3
That early post-communist stage of development of Bulgarian business generated 
also a specific form of financing of political parties through institutionalized 
administrative corruption which, for many years, determined the high corruption 
risk in the customs administration and the links of parties to organized crime. 
3 Hellman, Joel S., Geraint Jones and Daniel Kaufman Seize the State Seize the Day: State Capture, 
Corruption and Influence in Transition, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 2444, 
September 2000
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In the early years of the transition, new democratic entities could not rely on 
the financial support of businesses. They were either too weak and inexperienced 
in political investment or genetically linked to the former communist party. 
Therefore, the only venue they had was the government, which brought about a 
more rudimentary form of using administrative instead of political corruption for 
party financing. At that point of time, the long suppressed consumption unleashed 
a real boom in the importation of consumer goods, on most of which high 
customs duties or even excise taxes were levied. The tariff and excise tax evasion 
brought huge profits to the importers as a trade-off to a payment of a certain 
rate for each container imported. Participants in those schemes say that a certain 
portion of each bribe paid to the customs administration was distributed further 
up to the chain of government all the way to party treasuries. At the end of the 
1990’s, many customs duties were either reduced or removed and the scope of 
excise duties was confined to the typical excise goods (fuels, tobacco, alcohol 
and some luxury products). 
At the same time, parties already had their business partners and this primitive 
form of party financing through customs corruption became relatively inefficient. 
Some smuggling channels were legalized and moved away from the gray sector of 
the economy, while others, where customs duties, VAT and excise taxes continued 
to be the sources of considerable profit, shifted to the black sector. Besides, the 
target of political corruption moved toward the privatization process rather than 
imports. The consequences of those early forms of using organized administrative 
corruption for financing political parties continue to shape the specific features 
of the corrupt and criminal environment in Bulgaria. On the one hand, they 
determine the deep links among smuggling channels, businesses and politicians 
and, on the other, they demoralized the regular customs officers for a long time 
to come and impeded anti-corruption measures.
Today, the political corruption in Bulgaria takes much more developed and 
larger-scale forms, where public procurement occupies a sizeable place. After the 
privatization process was basically completed in the beginning of this decade, public 
procurement and concessions became a major sphere of large-scale corruption. 
Their place on the top of the pyramid of corrupt practices is determined by the 
large financial resources distributed within the public procurement system, and 
the related opportunities for personal enrichment. Also, precisely for that reason, 
financial abuse cannot happen without the involvement of and protection by 
high-level officials, and, finally, by the enormous economic and fiscal price that 
society has to pay.
On the other hand, the relative weight of financial abuse by sectoral contracting 
authorities is increasing. Such restructuring of the conventional corrupt practices 
depends also on the growing share of contracting authorities in this sector, 
and the relatively limited opportunities for public control. The third chapter 
of this study deals with the corruption risk and corrupt practices in the public 
procurement for the energy sector in Bulgaria.
1.2.  RESPONSIBILITY: POLITICAL OR ADMINISTRATIVE, COLLECTIVE OR   
 INDIVIDUAL
Unlike the other cases of fiscal corruption, public procurement involves mainly 
high-level corruption. The head of the institution or enterprise in the public sector 
is fully responsible for the awarding and implementation of public procurement 
contracts. The appointments of the leader are typically political, as are those 
of the board members in state-owned and municipal enterprises. Nevertheless, 
the cases of such corruption almost never reach the stage of holding anyone 
politically accountable. Rather, they often end with claims and disputes about the 
political merit for the detection of abuse at the lower levels of government. From 
here then the tendency of those in government4 to explain public procurement 
corruption, at least the violations reported, as being part of the administrative 
corruption. 
There is another common and disputable argument in the public debate concerning 
the anti-corruption measures in the public procurement sphere. Even when the 
issue is considered within the framework of political corruption, the tendency is 
to associate it primarily with the financing of political parties. Hence the anti-
corruption measures tend to focus on the increase of government subsidies for 
parties. It is important then to examine these two theses from the perspective of 
the anti-corruption policy.
First, is it possible for some of the abuses in this sphere to be in the scope of 
administrative corruption, i.e. to be unrelated to any collective partisan interests 
or individual interests of those in government? In other words, is it possible 
for the acquisition of goods and services in the public sector to bypass the 
political leader and be the result of action at the lower levels of government? 
Such a risk exists mainly in the case of small public procurement contracts in 
central government institutions, as well as in municipal procedures or contracts 
in hospitals, schools and others. But it also exists in large-scale procurement 
procedures which require high level of professional expertise. In cases like this 
it is possible for the experts to set such public procurement parameters or 
assess bids in a way that gives advantage to a specific bidder. However, the 
opportunities for this type of corruption at the expert level are quite limited. This 
would mean that there are no other bidders or experts to address the head of 
the institution with their arguments and that there is no pressure on the head 
from above or from outside by competitors. Moreover, consultants are involved 
when the specificities of the public procurement procedure are as complicated. 
In fact, if there is a corrupt scheme, it would be activated as early as the stage 
of the selection of a consultant so that to ensure advantages for a given bidder 
through the parameters of the public procurement procedure.
To put it in brief, it is not impossible for corruption in the public procurement 
sphere to result from the lack of control over the lower levels of government, 
i.e. to be more of the administrative type than of the political type of corruption. 
In reality, however, this option seems to be more of an exception than a rule in 
4 A recent example to this effect is the scandal with the abuses in the district heating company 
in Sofia (Toplofikatsia).
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large-scale public procurement contracts. It affects mainly small public procurement 
contracts. In 2006, the value of the contracts below the thresholds set out by the 
Public Procurement Act accounted for 6.3 % of all contracts. Although this small 
share was due mainly to the huge contract for the construction of Belene NPP, 
which was worth 7.82 billion leva, even without it, small contracts did not exceed 
19 % of the total value. It is even more important that the “small” corruption 
in the public procurement sphere does not relieve those in government from 
responsibility. In general, the corruption in the public procurement sphere is 
dominated by well-structured networks of targeted investments rather than by 
occasional actions of individuals at the lower levels of government due to 
negligence of their superiors. Therefore, this study is interested in analyzing 
this type of corruption as the driving force and tool of high-level corruption. 
This leads us to the second question: what is the driving force of corruption in 
the public procurement sphere – the need for financing political parties or the 
individual aspiration of politicians for private benefit?
When the objective is power, the benefits from the unlawful awarding of public 
procurement might go to the respective political party, i.e. to be associated with 
the financing of political activities aimed at coming to power. The roots of the 
use of government power for financing political parties are very deep indeed, 
dating back to the long years of the symbiosis between the party and the state. 
Some argue that, in such cases, the objective is not personal gains but it is the 
party itself or, even during the transition years, democracy itself. Is it possible 
that the ultimate goal of the abuse of public procurement would be the victory 
of the party cause rather than the victory of the people identifying themselves 
with it? Hopefully, politicians view power only as a tool to resolve the problems 
of their voters before they tackle their own problems. In this sense, in theory, it 
is possible to assume that if corruption in the public procurement sphere is used 
for financing political parties, it might not necessarily be directed to personal 
benefits. In practice, however, where corruption is used for undemocratic and 
non-transparent transferring of public resources to partisan treasuries, the ultimate 
goal is more power for the leaders and functionaries of the respective party. The 
purpose and use of government powers is another issue but it would hardly be 
realistic to accept that they are related primarily and only to the interests of their 
voters. They are more closely linked to personal interests, no matter whether the 
personal gain from coming to power is expressed in the form of money, power, 
or simply a lucrative public or corporate position. In the end, the benefit for the 
party as motivation for financial abuse within the public procurement sphere is 
ultimately aimed at personal benefit. 
Advanced democracies try to restrict these opportunities through greater transparency 
of party financing and accountability of political parties. In Bulgaria as well, anti-
corruption measures are, first and foremost, oriented toward legislation concerning 
the financing of political parties. In this context, the thesis that an effective anti-
corruption measure is the increase of the budget subsidies for political parties 
has become increasingly relevant. The argument goes that if parties had “enough” 
money, they would not use government power to derive financial benefits. So far 
though, there is no sound evidence to confirm this thesis neither in theory, nor 
in practice both at the individual level (pay rise for government officials) and at 
the group (party) level. This thesis would have some limited justifications if the 
use of power for financing parties or benefiting party sponsors was totally selfless, 
i.e. geared only toward the attainment of the party goals and in the interests of 
its members or supporters. Even in such a case there would hardly be a level of 
subsidy to be sufficient for all participants, i.e. to optimally reduce the economic 
incentives for political parties to resort to financing through political clientelism.
More frequently, high-level corruption results not from the striving to finance party 
activities and goals but from the aspiration of individual senior functionaries to 
use the government power to their own benefit, including direct financial gains. 
In this sense, high-level corruption results from the lack of inner-party democracy, 
transparency and control. After 16 years of transition, the political parties in 
Bulgaria today have unstable and frequently small or amorphous membership, 
incomplete structures, and therefore fragile democratic traditions. In short, parties 
lack sufficiently effective protection from being used for personal enrichment by 
individual senior functionaries. This drives away some of their supporters which, 
in turn, makes their dependence on political entrepreneurs and coalition or 
financial trade-offs bigger, increasing the risks of voter apathy and marginalization 
of the election process as a result.
The organizational weakness of political parties is among the major reasons for 
the lack of democratic control over the inner-party decision-making process. This 
explains the existing tendency in Bulgarian politics to rely more on the leader 
than on the party and the ideas it puts forward, i.e. to seek the “messiah” instead 
of the full use of the tools for civil control over holders of elective office. The 
result is a certain level of popular withdrawal from conventional parties and the 
search for some new forms of civic association and non-partisan representation.
In a nutshell, the crisis of political representation in Bulgaria - largely the 
result of voters being disillusioned by high-level corruption - has caused the 
main political parties to be dominated by a strong leader and has blurred the 
ideological distinctions between them. Political corruption has thrown political 
representation in the country into a downward spiral. In turn, the resulting 
emergence of domineering party leaders is isolating the parties from their voters 
and is increasing the risk of corruption. The fortunes of leaders thus end up 
depending not so much on the support of voters and sympathizers but rather on 
their ability to manipulate the party’s top brass.
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2. CORRUPTION RISK AND CORRUPT PRACTICES
The issue of the critical levels of political corruption in Bulgaria has been central 
to the public debate since the late 1990’s. This is largely due to the regular 
corruption assessment reports through the Corruption Monitoring System of Coalition 
2000, as well as the surveys of the Bulgarian Industrial Association and other 
non-governmental organizations. The latest monitoring reports of the European 
Commission on Bulgaria’s preparedness for membership of the European Union 
have also put forth the problem of political corruption.5 The reports identify the 
magnitude of high-level corruption and organized crime as the largest challenges 
to EU membership, relating it directly to the inefficient judiciary and the lack of 
effective court sentences. Europe’s sensitivity to this topic upon accession is fully 
understandable. During the first seven years of its membership Bulgaria will get 
access to substantial financial resources from the structural, cohesion and agrarian 
funds in the approximate amount of € 8 – 9 billion.6 The efficiency of European 
grant schemes depends primarily on the good governance and control systems at 
the central and local level. Political corruption in the allocation of EU funds to 
certain Bulgarian businesses and politicians would expose not only Bulgarian but 
also European taxpayers to the threat of direct losses.
The National Strategy for Transparent Governance, Prevention and Countering of Corruption 
2006-2008 identifies public procurement as a sphere with the highest corruption 
pressure because, together with concessions, public procurement is the main 
channel for directing public resources to the private sector. Let us, first of all, try 
to assess the scope of the problem and the related damage on the basis of an 
assessment of the size of the “market” for public procurement in Bulgaria. For 
the purposes of this study, with the caveat that the definition is quite conditional, 
we could define this market as the consumption of construction works, goods 
and services, which is carried out within the framework of the procedures 
and rules set out in the legislation for the awarding and implementation of 
public procurement contracts.  
5 See European Commission COM (2005) 534 and COM (2006) 549. 
6 National Strategic Reference Framework (version dated 14 September 2006) available online at 
http://www.eufunds.bg/docs/
2.1.  THE PUBLIC PROCUREMENT MARKET
The term “public procurement market” is used here conditionally. In order to 
assess the corruption risk in this sphere, we use it to define the consumption of 
goods, services and construction works in the public sector and the utilities, for 
which the legislation provides specific procedures to award and implement public 
procurement contracts. In other words, the definition rules out the consumption 
in which the choice of a supplier or a contractor does not require any specific 
procedure. According to Bulgarian laws, these are the public procurement contracts 
the value of which is below 100 thousand levs for construction works and 30 
thousand levs for the supply of goods or services. In this context, the public 
procurement market includes most of the current and investment consumption 
of the central and local government bodies and institutions, as well as the legal 
entities they finance and/or manage. These are the so-called “conventional” 
contracting authorities in the public procurement sphere. The public procurement 
market covers also the consumption by sectoral contracting authorities. These 
are the network suppliers of public services in the energy sector, water supply, 
transportation, and postal services. Regardless of whether they are public or private, 
due to being natural monopolies and due to the fact that their (in)efficiency is of 
huge importance for society, their current and investment consumption is covered 
by the legal framework regulating public procurement. 
Volume and structure. The value of the public procurement contracts awarded 
in 2005-2006 was 15,176 million levs,7 which was about 17% of the GDP 
generated in these years. This number gives a somewhat distorted picture of the 
actual size of the public procurement market in Bulgaria since more than half 
of it accounted for a single transaction, i.e. the contract for the construction 
of the two units of the Belene Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) worth 7,817 million 
levs which was concluded in 2006. Therefore to give a more valid picture, the 
figures concerning the public procurement market are presented here with and 
without the NPP contract. Leaving Belene NPP aside, the value of the public 
procurement contracts signed in Bulgaria accounted for some 8% to 9% of the 
country’s GDP (Table 1).
7  Net of VAT
Table 1.  Total value of public procurement contracts in 
Bulgaria 2005-2006 (mln levs)
2005 2006 2006*
Total Value 3,296.0 11,879.8 4,061.8
Share of GDP 7.9 % 24.2 % 8.3 %
*Without Belene NPP; GDP forecast for 2006 is 48 billion levs
Source: Public Procurement Agency (PPA), National Statistical Institute and own calculations
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The increased corruption risk in public procurement is largely associated with 
the fact that this market is strongly dominated by construction works. In 2006, 
construction works accounted for 83% of the total value of all contracts but a 
longer period of monitoring would probably reveal that such a high percentage 
is rather an exception due to the contract for Belene NPP. Leaving that aside, 
construction works accounted for half of the total value of the public procurement 
contracts signed in Bulgaria. About one-third of all contracts relate to the supply 
of goods and about one-sixth cover the provision of services (Figure 2).
As to the supply of goods, over 40% of the value of the contracts covers 
four industries: the chemical industry (mainly pharmaceuticals), machinery and 
equipment, fuels, and medical instruments and equipment. The ranking of the 
most consumed goods reveals that the health sector is the largest consumer of 
goods in the public sector. The leaders in the public procurement market for 
services are business services, waste management and environment protection, as 
well as repair and maintenance works.
These three service sectors, together with the four sectors concerning goods, 
account for approximately two-thirds of the value of all contracts awarded during 
the period under review. 
Figure 2.  Structure of the public procurement market 























These figures relate to the registered public procurement market in Bulgaria. 
The actual size of the public procurement market is 20% to 25% larger. It 
includes transactions which are not subject to registration (for instance, those 
related to national defense and security), as well as transactions which are 
subject to registration but have not been registered for various reasons. It also 
includes transactions concluded without any tender procedure regardless of legal 
Source: Public Procurement Agency, the data cover the period from 1 October 2004 to 30 June 2006. 
Service sectors are highlighted.
Table 2.  Value of the contracted goods and services by 
sectors in 2004-2006 (net of VAT)
Sector (Classification Group in the PP) mln levs Share
1 Chemical industry (24-25) 463.02
42.3 %
out of which pharmaceuticals (244) 408.63
2 Machinery and equipment  (29), 404.70
out of which turbines and reactors (291) 69.43
3 Oil products and fuels (23) 402.59
4 Medical and other instruments and devices (33) 357.02
 out of which medical equipment (331) 267.95
5 Professional and business services (74) 342.04
24.4 %6 Waste management and protection of the environment (90) 317.77
7 Repair and maintenance works (50) 281.13
8 Office and computer equipment, of which (30) 187.52
office equipment (301) 47.18
computer equipment  (302) 83.13
9 Semi-finished products  (28) 173.25
out of which, metal products (281-287) 110.88
building materials (288) 63.44
10 Electrical machines and equipment (31) 126.03
11 Motor vehicles (34) 93.99
12 Financial services (66-67) 80.55
13 Food, beverages, tobacco products (15-16) 77.62
14 Textiles, garments and leather products (17-19) 62.36
15 Energy (40) 53.82
out of which: nuclear fuel (405) 1.23
16 Other goods 262.87
17 Other services 163.76
Total 3,850.04
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requirements for that. Thus the size of the public procurement market in Bulgaria 
today can be estimated at approximately 10% to 12% of the GDP, i.e. 4.5 - 
5.5 billion levs in 2006.
Dynamics. The difficulties in the assessment of the volume of the public 
procurement market in Bulgaria are partially due to its high growth rates and 
the fact that it is far from its equilibrium state. Only two years ago, the average 
annual size of the public procurement market was put at 1.8 - 2 billion levs 
(5 % of GDP) on an average annual basis,8 while today it is some three times 
larger. Figure 3 shows the almost quadrupling of the number of contracts between 
2000 and 2006. Part of that growth resulted from the increase in the registered 
contracts and perhaps covered mainly lower value market segments. Therefore 
growth rates were more modest in value terms but they were equally impressive. 
These high growth rates of the value of public procurement contracts in the initial 
years of Bulgaria’s EU membership will continue, coming closer to the EU public 
procurement average market size of 16.3% of GDP. Moreover, growth will be 
further fuelled by the drive for Bulgaria to quickly overcome gaps in its basic, 
communication and environmental infrastructure to meet the requirements of the 
European internal market. This is the purpose of the substantial amount of EU 
funding to be allocated to Bulgaria in the first 7 years of its EU membership. A 
large portion of the money entering the country through the EU structural funds 
will be distributed via the public procurement procedures. The public procurement 
market can be expected to grow by an average of 6% to 7% per year during 
the first seven years of membership. According to the most conservative estimates 
(i.e. without the sizable transactions of the Belene NPP type), this implies that the 
average annual volume of the market will reach 6 - 7 billion levs in 2007-2008.
Figure 3.  Number of contracts awarded in 2000-2006
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Source: Public Procurement Agency,
8 See BIA, Public Procurement Monitoring: The Most Common Violations and Corrupt Practices, Sofia, 
p. 4 (http://www.bia-bg.com/files/ZOP-broshura-2005.rtf).
2.2. LEVEL AND SPREAD OF PUBLIC PROCUREMENT CORRUPTION
It is to be expected that this large and very dynamic market of the Bulgarian 
economy and the related opportunities for excessive profit and non-market and/
or non-regulated income it creates would generate strong incentives for both 
suppliers of goods and services and contracting authorities to resort to corrupt 
behaviors.
Despite that, the data from the Corruption Monitoring System (CMS) of the 
Center for the Study of Democracy point to a downward trend. Five years ago, 
every other company participating in a public procurement procedure admitted 
to paying a bribe; in 2005, one in three respondent companies shared such an 
experience, while in 2007 only one in ten companies paid a bribe in public 
procurement (Figure 4).
However, some caveats apply to these optimistic results. Other CMS indicators 
raise the issue whether these statistics are indicative of reduced corruption in the 
public procurement sphere or rather of its institutionalization, i.e. its migration 
from the medium administrative level to the higher levels of the executive power 
and its transformation from occasional deals to closed corrupt networks known 
as “loops of companies”. Several arguments tend to tilt the balance to the latter 
conclusion. First, the suspected concentration of public procurement corruption 
into the higher levels of government is corroborated by the reduced number of 
participants in public procurement tenders. Fewer and fewer companies, especially 
new entrants, take part in the announced procedures. Since 2003, the share of 
the companies which have participated in public procurement procedures has 
decreased by two-thirds: from 43% in 2002 to 14% in 2006 (Figure 5).
Figure 4.  Share of the companies which resorted to bribery in 
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Second, the size of the bribes has increased (Figure 6). Finally, the victimization 
surveys underlying the CMS give the best reflection of the personal involvement 
in corrupt practices where respondents perceive themselves as victims. In other 
words, they reflect the intensity of the administrative corruption in the public 
procurement sphere. Their capacity to gauge the large-scale political corruption 
within public procurement is limited. Businesses are accomplices rather than 
victims in this case.
Figure 5.  Share of the companies which took part in a public 
procurement procedure (% of the respective group)













Source:  Vitosha Research. The month and the year indicate the time of the respective survey, 
reflecting the experience of the respondents in the previous year 

















This is confirmed also by the CMS indicators which show the assessment, rather than 
the personal involvement, of entrepreneurs of the level and spread of corruption 
in the public procurement. Although there are signs of a decline, 60% of the 
Bulgarian companies still assess corrupt practices in the public procurement as 
“widespread” (Figure 7).
42% of the Bulgarian entrepreneurs assess the share of discredited procedures 
in their industry to more than 25%, and one in eight companies states that 
procedures are strictly followed only in less than 25% of the cases (Figure 8).
фирми е давала подкуп (Фигура 4).
Figure 7.  Assessment of the spread of corruption in the public 
procurement sector given by businesses (% of those 
respondents who answered that it was widely spread)












Figure 8. Share of discredited procedures in your industry
 (% of the participants in public procurement 
procedures who specified the respective percentage)
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Besides sociological (soft) data, there are some hard data proving the relatively 
high levels of corrupt practices and corruption risk within public procurement. 
For instance, a good measure for the substantial corruption risk in this sphere is 
the share of regulation violations actually detected (Table 3). The relative share of 
discredited procedures in public procurement in Bulgaria in value terms is more 
than 50% according to the findings of internal auditors. In 2005, the Bulgarian 
Public Internal Financial Control Agency (PIFCA) audited 6,399 procedures (some 
60% of all registered) at a total value of 1.2 billion levs and found out violations 
of procedures in 1,609 cases at a total value of 567 million levs. Some three-
quarters of the revealed violations refer to small scale public procurement which 
accounts for only 9% of the violations in monetary terms. Over 91% of the 
value of revealed irregularities were for procedures regulated by the Law on 
Public Procurement (LPP).9 Furthermore, the internal audit found that authorities 
failed to hold public procurement procedures for projects in the amount of 
98.5 million levs, although the grounds for holding them existed. This adds up to 
a total of 666 million levs in violated procedures and failure to hold procedures 
in 2005 or 56% of the value of all procedures checked by PIFCA. Such a high 
level of non-compliance can hardly be explained with procedural mistakes as a 
result of legal incompetence or administrative inertia and lack of interest. Instead, 
it rather testifies to widespread corrupt practices.
9  See Report of the Public Internal Financial Control Agency for 2005, Sofia, May 2006,  
  http://www.advfk.minfin.bg/files/docs3_2005.pdf
Source: PPA, PIFCA









Registered procedures (1) 6,572 6,801 10,583 3,296.0
Audited (2) 6,096 729.1 5,624 988.0 6,399 1,200.0
Violated procedures 1,941 350.0 1,479 249.5 1,609 567.0
Violations established 2,154 2,551 567.0
under the LPP 651 515.3
under the RSPP 1,900 51.7
Failures to conduct procedures 820 85.0 484 79.8 641 98.5
Total violations and failures (3) 2,761 435.0 1,963 329.3 2,250 665.5
Share of audited procedures (2/1) 92.8% 82.7% 60.5% 36.4%
Violations/audited procedures ratio (3/2)  45.3% 59.7% 34.9% 33.3% 35.2% 55.5%
Violations/registered procedures ratio (3/1) 42.0% 28.9% 21.3% 20.2%
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Another useful indicator of the corruption risk level in public procurement is 
the share of the contracts signed through various forms of negotiation with the 
contractor, i.e. without full prior disclosure of the parameters of the procurement 
in advance. First and foremost, it should be pointed out that such procedures are 
not only provided by law but, in the case of some complex transactions, they are 
desirable to guarantee the best protection of public interest. From the entry into 
force of the Law on Public Procurement in 1999 to its amendment in 2004, however, 
the share of procedures employing negotiations rather than open competition 
tenders tripled, reaching a peak of 44% in 2003 before falling back again (Figure 
8). This growth could possibly be related to more diligent reporting compliance (i.e. 
entering of the transactions in the Public Procurement Register). Nevertheless, these 
figures show that corruption pressure is concentrated largely in the negotiation type 
procedures of public procurement. The experience with the amendments of 2004, 
however, clearly shows that corruption can be substantially reduced through more 
strict regulations concerning the application of the procedures.
Data about the relative share (in value terms) of procurement procedures based 
on direct negotiation, i.e. without competitive bidding, are more useful for 
corruption risk assessment. The estimates for 2005-2006 (Figure 10) reveal that it is 
much higher than their share in the total number of procedures.10 However, the 
data cover only a short period of time and, besides, they include the Belene NPP 
deal. Therefore they are used here rather as a point of departure in the corruption 
risk assessment and not so much as the basis for any firm conclusions.
Figure 9.  Share of the procedures involving negotiations
 (% of the number of contracts awarded in 2000– 2006)





























Source:  Public Procurement Register (2000-2004); Public Procurement Agency (2005-2006). 
In 2005 and 2006, the procedures involving negotiations included both negotiations 
with announcements and negotiations without announcements under the LPP and 
the RSPP.
10 The Public Procurement Register does not provide such statistical information for 2000-2004 
(prior to the establishment of the Public Procurement Agency). The PPA data used here cover 
the period from 1 October 2004 to 30 June 2006. 
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The growth of corruption in the public procurement sphere was noted also by 
external observers. According to the report of the European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (EBRD) on transition economies in 2005, public procurement 
corruption was the only one to worsen in Bulgaria over the period between 
2002 and 2005.11 In terms of that indicator, Bulgaria ranked second-to-last in 
South-Eastern Europe (before Albania) and it was the only country to report 
deterioration over time.
2.3. THE COST
The issue of the economic cost of corruption in the public procurement sphere is 
important from the perspective of the ex-ante impact assessment, i.e. the selection 
of anti-corruption instruments, and the ex-post assessment of their efficiency.
First and foremost, corruption in the public procurement sector causes direct 
fiscal damage. It is due to the artificially inflated prices of supplies, which include 
excessive profits for the suppliers and the corruption income of the responsible 
officials. Despite this the corrupt interaction does not always lead to excessive 
costs. More often than not beating of competition in an open tender requires for 
lower delivery prices. Then the excessive profit for the supplier and the bribe the 
contracting authority are a result of the compromises with the quality and the 
parameters of the supply contract. In other words, there are no excessive fiscal 
costs but there are welfare losses because society does not receive the public 
goods in the quantities and the quality it has paid for. Quite frequently these 
compromises could lead to higher costs in the operation or consumption of the 
goods and services supplied under a particular public procurement contract, i.e. 
Figure 10.  Share of the procedures involving negotiations














Source:   Public Procurement Agency (2005-2006). The data in value terms cover the period 
from 1 October 2004 to 30 June 2006. In 2005 and 2006, the procedures involving 
negotiations included both negotiations with announcements under the LPP and the 
negotiations with invitations under the RSPP. 
11 The EBRD conclusions in its Transition Report 2005 are based on data from Business Environment 
and Enterprise Performance Survey in Eastern Europe and Central Asia for 2002 and 2005.
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transfer of budget spending further in time or to other institutions, beyond the 
time-line of the specific tender.
The accurate assessment of the fiscal damage in the form of unjustified excessive 
spending or other public loss as a result of violating the procedures is a difficult 
exercise based on many assumptions. A somewhat useful point of departure 
is the information from the Bulgarian internal audit agency with regard to 
the reported violations listed in Table 3. The total value of the infringements 
of statutory requirements in 2005 was approximately 666 million levs or 56% 
of the total value subject to internal audit in the public procurement sector. 
If this percentage is extrapolated to the estimated size of the whole public 
procurement market (4 - 5 billion levs in 2005), the total value of compromized 
procedures would reach 2.2 – 2.8 billion levs.
This amount reflects the value of infringed procedures but not the value of the 
violations themselves. In other words, it is not equal to the fiscal damage caused 
by corruption. The latter is equal to the excessive rent derived by the contracting 
authority and the contractor for their personal benefit due to the suppression 
of competition. The differential between the market price of the supply of the 
procurement and its tendering price (or the discrepancies in the quantity and 
quality of the procurement respectively) constitutes the real loss to society. The 
excessive rent generated by corruption and the lack of competition, although more 
easily seen at the level of individual transactions, can hardly be calculated at the 
macro-level. If we assume that it is divided equally between the parties in the 
corrupt deal, then the losses for the budget would be double the amount of bribes 
in this sector. According to CMS of the Center for the Study of Democracy in 
2005, the average size of the bribe within the public procurement sector accounted 
for about 7 % of the value of the contract.12 This implies that, in a conservative 
scenario, the average amount of the excessive profit generated by corruption and 
the lack of competition within the public procurement sector is approximately 
15%. Since the value of infringed procedures is 2.2 – 2.8 billion levs, the losses 
resulting from financial abuse in the public procurement would range between 
330 million and 420 million levs. 
The expected amount of losses should be considered as an underestimate for 
a number of reasons. First, it reflects a conservative estimate of the potential 
size of the public procurement market at 4 – 5 billion levs. Second, it is based 
on a quite optimistic estimate of the efficiency of the internal audit in Bulgaria. 
In other words, it builds on the assumption that the frequency of violations in 
the procedures outside the scope of the audit is similar to that in the audited 
procedures. In fact, if there was an efficient risk assessment and management 
system, the degree of deviation in the audited procedures should have been 
even higher than in the rest of the procedures. In this case, a lower estimate 
for the total number of irregular public procurement procedures would apply to 
say about 40 – 45% of the awarded contracts. This, however, would only be 
a realistic assumption in the case that an independent inspection with proven 
professionalism and integrity existed in Bulgaria.
12 On the Eve of EU Accession: Anti-corruption Reforms in Bulgaria, Center for the Study of Democracy, 
Sofia 2006, p. 29.
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Does the former Public Internal Financial Control Agency, currently the Public 
Financial Inspection Agency at the Minister of Finance, meet this definition? Are 
businesses right to suspect that its activities are influenced by political pressures 
and that most of the violations are found in the small public procurement 
contracts at the lower levels of government? Some grounds for such doubts can 
be seen in the data contained in the latest internal audit report of 2005.
According to that report, the procedures audited in 2005 accounted for some 
60% of all procedures but only 36% of their total value (See Table 3 above). 
Some 75% of all detected violations were small-scale public procurement, as 
defined by the law, but they accounted for only 9% of the violations in total 
value terms. One can conclude that the strict internal audit covers primarily the 
lower market segment, i.e. the administrative aspects of the risk of corruption. 
If that were the case, an assumption about a higher percentage of infringed 
procedures in value terms would probably be closer to actual levels.
Finally, the assumption concerning the amount of the rent could also prove quite 
conservative. International studies show that the size of the bribe is usually very 
small compared to the benefit it provides for the supplier. Moreover, in the 
case of political corruption, the classical cash kick-back has limited application, 
giving way to other types of benefits and protection: support and financing for 
electoral campaigns, securing  emlpyment after resigning from a governmental or 
administrative position, scholarships for close relatives, safeguards against criminal 
prosecution, etc. If that was the case, the more realistic estimate for the excessive 
profit generated by corruption in the public procurement market in Bulgaria 
could amount to 25% to 30%, which effectively doubles the assumption on the 
damage caused to society.
To sum up, if we abandon all conservative assumptions underlying the above- 
mentioned optimistic estimate of the fiscal losses from corruption in the public 
procurement sector, they could reach 1 billion levs annually, i.e. some 20 - 25% 
of the size of the market or approximately 2.4% of GDP. All this leads to the 
conclusion that the actual size of the losses from public procurement corruption 
tends to come close to such a level.  
Corruption in the public procurement sector not only generates losses for the 
public sector but it also inflicts economic damage to the private sector which 
could be much greater and more overarching than the fiscal damage. The 
direct economic damage is associated with the losses of bona fide traders who 
could be more productive than those who win tenders by bribing. Because of 
corruption, the market cannot recognize and reward their productivity. Market 
distortions occur and generate disincentives on the supply side and hence the 
damage is partially transferred to consumers through the prices charged on the 
market. Corruption within the public procurement could be also an instrument 
for attaining oligopoly on some markets, where the excessive profit generated 
from the public sector makes it possible for corrupt companies to sell to private 
consumers at lower prices and thus crowd out the other, especially smaller 
firms from the market. Hence, the particular damage which corruption in public 
procurement causes to small and medium-sized enterprises. 
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Another indirect cost for fair businesses is the increase in the administrative costs 
for participation in public tenders. This is a result of the attempts by the public 
authorities to apply more and more administrative measures to curb corruption 
and financial abuse which increases the compliance costs for the companies, 
especially smaller ones.
2.4. AREAS OF INCREASED CORRUPTION RISK IN THE PUBLIC PROCUREMENT 
SECTOR
Most of the abuses in the public procurement field occur in the awarding 
procedures. These are the stages in which the tender documentation is prepared 
and bids are ranked. According to the survey conducted among businesses in 
January 2007, the most common infringements of rules, which participants in 
public procurement procedures in Bulgaria encounter are related to the ensuring 
of undue advantage to specific bidders (41 %), and the manipulation of the 
announced assessment criteria (32 %).
Figure 11  What corrupt practices have you encountered in 
public procurement procedures? (% of the answers)
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What follows is a non-exhaustive list of the typical tools used for restricting the 
range of participants and the directing of the outcome of the tender procedure 
to the benefit of a specific participant in public procurement procedures.
Direct non-compliance. The direct non-compliance through contracts awarded 
in violation of the law without any tendering or competitive bidding procedure 
is still widely spread. Although this type of violation is observed mainly in the 
case of small-scale procurement by authorities in education, health and local 
government, the total effect of such violations is not small at all. In 2005, for 
example, PIFCA detected failure to hold due procurement procedures worth 98.5 
million levs, up from 80 million levs in 2004. In other words, about one-fifth of 
the value of all reported violations is due to brazen disrespect of the law. Even 
if we assume that the detection rate is much higher in this market segment due 
to the direct nature of the violation and the relative lack of political protection 
in comparison to large-scale supplies, the relative weight of this type of violations 
in the total volume of damage (including the non-detected damage) seems 
significant. It is indicative of the insufficient deterrent effect of the sanctions 
compared to the benefits of the corrupt action. Although the action is most 
likely to be detected, the effective sanctions seem so soft that they could hardly 
compare to the benefits. An additional motive for such behavior in the case 
of school headmasters and hospital managers, for example, is the low level of 
salaries and the diluted control shared by the central and local government, 
which makes them feel immune to penalties.
Circumvention of the law. Another relatively less risky way of awarding public 
procurement contracts to pre-determined bidders is by breaking the supply 
into smaller parts, which fall below the tendering thresholds stipulated by the 
law, allowing the public authority to go for direct awarding. As it will be 
explained further in this paper, one of the techniques to modernize the public 
procurement system in Bulgaria has been to raise the thresholds in order to 
reduce the compliance costs for businesses in small-scale procurement. As a 
result, the current thresholds for obligatory tendering in public procurement are 
100 thousand levs for construction works and 30 thousand levs for the supply of 
goods or services. These thresholds seem high for Bulgaria because they leave 
one quarter to one third of the public sector consumption beyond the scope of 
the existing legislation. 
Abuses in the definition of the parameters and technical specifications of 
public procurement procedures. It becomes increasingly difficult, in most cases, 
to ignore or circumvent the tender procedures prescribed by law. Thus, corrupt 
contracting authorities use an alternative set of tools to direct the procedure so 
that the preferred bidder wins. One of the tricks employed is to put down such 
parameters and specifications of the procured product or service in the bidding 
requirements, which though not essential for the quality of the public good 
provided, rule out some bidders from the competition or directly predetermine 
the outcome. This is quite a widely used method and although it is quite easy 
to detect it, it remains relatively unpunished. In other words, it is one of the 
methods which obviously hamper fair competition but it is rarely punished as 
a violation of the law. It is usually applied when the contractor is selected in 
advance at political level and the stakes are so high that neither the supplier can 
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afford to lose nor the tendering authorities can afford the risk of failure for the 
conduct of an outright scam procedure with a predetermined outcome.
Abuses in the definition of the selection criteria. An alternative and not so overt 
instrument for directing the tender to the desired outcome, but also with a less 
clear result, is the definition of such selection criteria which leave sufficient room 
for discretion and manipulation of results. Usually, this is achieved by enhancing 
the share of the qualitative indicators at the expense of quantitative ones, such 
as the price and other measurable technical parameters. Some criteria could be 
too abstract or outright useless for the assessment of the relevance of the supplied 
product to the satisfaction of the public consumer. Examples of such criteria are 
“quality of the proposal” or “vision for the development of the sector”.13
Others are related to the assessment of the supplier rather than the supplied 
good or service. These are for example all the so-called “guarantees” for the 
capacity of the supplier to deliver the procured product in connection with 
specific experience, annual turnover or participation in similar tenders. The logic 
of such “insurance” on the part of the contracting authority is acceptable to a 
certain extent but, in practice, it restricts competition and confines the public 
procurement market to a narrow range of pre-selected eligible bidders. It leaves 
out companies which could offer better and more innovative solutions but lack 
the required “eligibility” to reach consumers.
Even the quantitative parameters of public procurement can be deliberately 
manipulated to make the direct comparison of bids more difficult and to increase 
the chance for applying administrative discretion in the selection procedure. 
Finally, even the price, which typically weighs a lot in the assessment (most 
frequently it forms more than 50 % of the final evaluation result), is only one 
of the cost elements. Manipulative pricing can often display publicly only the 
immediate costs of a facility without taking account of potential increase in the 
operational costs of the facility in the future. A more objective criterion would 
be the direct comparison of the overall net present value of alternative projects. 
It also includes the discounted future expenditures for the maintenance and 
operation, including warranty support, spare parts, consumables, etc.
Manipulation of the assessment and ranking. Next, even if all selection criteria 
are well chosen and specified, the end result can still be manipulated to the benefit 
of one or another bidder. A kind of guarantee against such practices seems to be 
the use of a pre-selected formula to calculate the final assessment comprising of all 
the quantitative and qualitative indicators with their respective weights. However, 
contracting authorities in Bulgaria rarely provide any written argument or statement 
to explain the assessment of the various components of the bid and the ranking. 
Thus the scores by individual criteria can be manipulated and adjusted to a desired 
final ranking. It is possible to do so because the individual components are not 
assessed and announced independently from one another, and also because the 
final assessment is not the result of independent expert appraisal.
13 BIA Public Procurement Monitoring: The Most Common Violations and Corrupt Practices, Sofia, p. 18
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Lack of full transparency in the announcement of the bids and the ranking. The 
lack of transparency with regard to the parameters of the bids in tender procedures 
creates opportunities for further adjustment and improvement of certain bids before 
the final ranking is announced. Such a blackout is a condition and invitation to 
resort to corrupt manipulation of the tender procedure.
Other barriers to participation in public procurement. Sometimes the costs for 
participation in the tenders are artificially inflated to discourage ‘accidental’ players. 
Although the Bulgarian law does allow the price of the tender documentation 
to exceed its production cost, in most cases it resembles more a participation 
fee rather than a charge to cover actual costs. In some cases it is excessive and 
functions as a filter at the input stage of the tender procedure. Similar barriers are 
also the unrealistically short deadlines for the submission of bids which can only 
be met only by companies which have been tipped off in advance. This corrupt 
practice is related to the leakage of information about the terms of reference for 
the benefit of a preferred supplier. 
Cancellation or discontinuation of tender procedures. Lastly, if all these measures 
cannot ensure the victory of the preferred supplier, the contracting authority might 
terminate the procedure, citing as excuses either lack of financing or discrepancies 
between the bids and the terms of reference. In most cases, there are no clear 
arguments to support such decisions and outsiders are left only with the costs of 
bidding in the tender procedure and with a general feeling of distrust in the official 
rules of the game. Such negative experiences from the participation in irregular 
procedures act to restrict competition and expand further the range of companies 
prepared to pay bribes in public procurement procedures.
All the above corrupt practices employed in Bulgaria are related to the directing 
and awarding of a contract to a preferred supplier ensuring personal benefits for 
the public officials representing the contracting authorities. They cover the stages 
of the preparation of the tender documentation and the ranking of the bidders in 
accordance with the announced criteria. But corruption in the public procurement 
sphere does not end there. The stage of the implementation of public procurement 
contracts is not protected against the risk of abuse and corrupt practices either. 
Limited opportunities for appeal. In some cases, the contracting authorities do 
not advise the failed bidders in due course which deprives them of legal remedy 
within the time limits prescribed by law.
Implementation of the contract. The most widely spread corrupt practice at the 
implementation stage of public procurement in Bulgaria is the renegotiation of the 
qualitative parameters of the contract or their outright neglect, or even the change 
in the price terms. Thus, the contractor who has paid a bribe is able to offer much 
higher quality at a lower price in the bid, knowing that these bidding parameters 
are intended only to beat the competiton and can be changed during the 
implementation phase. Indeed, the amendments to the Law on Public Procurement 
of 2004 tried to put effective barriers to the common practice of signing annexes 
to the contracts intended to change the initial terms of the public procurement 
contact. But, at the same time, the law does not include any provisions to ensure 
control over the implementation of the contract in accordance with the terms and 
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conditions of the tender. In fact, the LPP regulates the process until the signing 
of the contract. If there are no changes to the contract, the control over its 
implementation is left beyond the scope of the law.
From the viewpoint of the size of the transactions, the data of the internal 
audits show that the corruption risk increases in line with the size of the public 
procurement value. This is no surprise: large-scale corruption occurs where there is 
a lot of money involved. Nevertheless, the public debate on this issue was focused 
for quite some time on the thresholds set out in the LPP and the negative effect of 
their increase on the corruption risk. Most of the internal audit resources were also 
allocated in this area. Out of the 2,551 violations established in 2005, 1,900 were in 
the category of small-scale procurement but their total value was 51.7 million levs, 
i.e. 9% of the total value of uncovered irregular procedures. This distribution of 
the risk comes to support the suggestion that, from the viewpoint of the efficiency 
of control and business costs in the supply of goods and services to the public 
sector, it is better to raise the public procurement thresholds and to allocate the 
available administrative resources for the enforcement of the law on the biggest 
transactions. The optimal internal audit coverage target could be the transactions 
which constitute 60% to 70% of the value of all procurement contracts signed. At 
present, the share of the audited procedures is some 30% to 35% in value terms. 
The data from the internal audit report show that the emphasis is on small-scale 
procurement, i.e. the lower levels of government.
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3. THE ENERGY SECTOR – A SECTOR OF HIGH CORRUPTION RISK
3.1. SOURCES OF CORRUPTION RISK
The energy sector is among the most important industries in the national economy 
with a major share in the industrial added value.14 According to the data of 
the Ministry of the Economy and Energy,15 the generation of electricity in 
2005 reached approximately the 1988 level, when it was 45,000 GWh annually. 
Currently, it is about 44,000 GWh anually. While taking into account the technical 
and commercial losses, some 27,000 GWh out of this quantity are hypothetically 
sold at a value exceeding 2 billion levs net of the VAT. Besides, there is the added 
value in the other energy sub-sectors, such as the production of and trade in coal 
and other solid fuels, gas and heating, the extraction of oil and natural gas, and 
the management of water energy resources. 
At least a half of the companies with the largest sales in this country operate 
in the energy sector.16 Over the recent years, the National Electricity Company 
(NEC) and Bulgargas have traditionally topped the ranking, while the Sofia City 
Electric Distribution Company, Maritsa-East 2 TPP and others have been in the 
top ten. However, they do not occupy leading positions in terms of investment 
efficiency. The profit of producers and distributors of electricity decreases over time, 
whereas the contractors implementing public procurement contracts awarded by 
the biggest energy companies are considered to be some of the most profitable 
businesses in the country. For instance, the Bulgarian Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry ranking in 2004 showed that the National Electricity Company was 
number one in sales but its profit was less than 1 %. NEC ranked 88th in terms 
of the return on investment with its assets worth 3.17 billion levs. Kozlodui NPP 
ranked fourth in terms of its gross sales reaching close to 645 million levs but its 
profitability continued to lag behind. Maritsa-East 2 TPP occupied the eighth place 
in the BCCI ranking with its revenues of almost 305 million levs but in terms 
of profitability it ranked as low as 59th. In 2005, the financial condition of large 
producers did not improve: NEC reported book profit of only 66.8 million levs, 
Kozlodui NPP was already loss-generating, and electric distribution companies 
reported minimal profits.
In the face of the shrinking profits of monopoly producers that, over the 







14 The gross added value of the country was reported by the NSI to be slightly over 36 billion levs in 
2005, out of which industry accounted for some 11 billion levs (26.1%). See www.nsi.bg/gdp/
15 See http://www.seerecon.org/infrastructure/sectors/energy/ and V. Anastasov’s presentation 
“Electricity Consumption Forecasts” at the round table discussion Bulgaria’s Energy Sector – 
What’s Next? Held by the MEE and the World Energy Council on 20 March 2006.
16 According to the ranking of the Top 10 Companies 2005 in terms of sales revenues announced 
by the Bulgarian Chamber of Commerce and Industry.
largest sales and, at the same time, it was awarded the largest public procurement 
contract for repair works of the facilities at Kozlodui NPP. Moreover, Risk Engineering 
ranked first in terms of return on investment (profit per 100 levs of assets) and 
second in terms of profitability. It would be interesting to compare the growth of 
the sales and profitability of the NEC intermediary companies in the exports of 
electricity. It cannot be done, however, due to the restricted access to information.
The great turnovers in the context of the major intervention of the government 
and the lack of competitive environment expose the sector to substantial 
corruption risks. In 2004, the then Ministry of Energy and Energy Resources 
(MEER) admitted that the corruption risk “remained high” in that sector due to:
• the insufficient legal regulation at the national and institutional levels on 
the status and functions of the specialized anti-corruption structure at the 
MEER;
• the large stakes and the substantial financial resources in the energy 
sector;
• the process of privatization of the electric distribution companies;
• the large investment projects in terms of both number and value;
• the pressing need for strengthening of the capacity of inspectorates;
• the need for introduction of a training system for the people involved in 
the combat against corruption;
• the need for development of a policy to increase salaries as a factor for 
the reduction of the corruption risk.17
But those observations did not bring about any real practical measures. Moreover, 
there are many signs of the growing level of corruption in the energy sector. One 
of them is the increased share of the exported electricity by private intermediaries 
rather than by NEC. In the opinion of the former Member of Parliament Mr. 
Lambovski, bribes in the energy sector amount to some 10 million levs on a 
monthly basis. Besides, the corruption potential in the sector is used very skillfully 
and intensely under the guise of claims that the highest political and national 
interests are protected in this way. What are the reasons and conditions for this 
situation?
First, the energy sector suffers from lack of competition and from inefficient 
government regulation, both of which create conditions that incur excessive costs 
at the expense of consumers. They generate considerable corruption resources 
and opportunities for their distribution opposite to the logic of the market. 
Energy activities are heavily regulated. The Law on Energy defines a wide range 
of activities subject to regulation: generation, imports and exports, transmission, 
transit transmission, distribution of electricity and heating, natural gas, oil and oil 
17  The Energy Sector Has a Huge Kick-back Potential, The Monitor daily, 21 December 2004.
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products, trade in electricity and heating and natural gas, and use of renewable 
energy sources. However, the regulatory body, the State Energy and Water 
Regulatory Commission (SEWRC), is not protected against the pressures which 
those managing the sector might exert in pursuit of personal interests. This is partly 
due to the closed circle of energy experts and also to the huge financial stakes. 
Since there are no opportunities to seek collective (group) remedies, citizens are 
discouraged to withstand their rights before SEWRC because the personal interest 
of individuals has too low individual value compared to the legal defence costs.
SEWRC is required by law to control electricity producers and distributors so 
that to prevent them from using their monopoly position on the market to the 
detriment of consumers. But it seems that the price control is focused primarily 
on the electric distribution companies. However, distribution is only the final stage 
in the whole chain. In fact, in a monopoly environment distributors are expected 
to take up the protection of the end consumers without any opportunities to 
influence the other participants upstream all the way to the producers and the 
importers of energy sources. Thus the regulatory control of electricity producers 
remains very limited. They are shielded by their principal and the discontent of 
consumers can easily be re-directed to the suppliers which often operate even 
under the acceptable standards of service, although they have been privatized. 
But the law requires comprehensive auditing of the way in which producers form 
their prices at which they sell to the distributors (electric distribution companies 
or EDCs). 
A formal procedure does exist. The business plans of producer companies are 
examined and approved by SEWRC. They can well envisage excessive expenditure 
that nobody would control because of the lack of capacity at the regulatory 
authority and sometimes also because of the inability of the companies themselves 
to draw up business plans. No precise economic analysis is carried out to check 
the way in which companies are managed or the practical need for one or 
another kind of expenditures and mainly the efficiency of the investment policies 
calculated in prices per unit of capacity and compared to the average European 
efficiency benchmarks.
The management of NEC and Kozlodui NPP use all kinds of pretexts to warn 
that the price of electricity would be increased soon. Last year, for example, NEC 
made forecasts that the price of electricity would grow by 30 % upon the closing 
down of units 3 and 4 of Kozlodui NPP. The estimates of Ms. Dilovska, who was 
Deputy Minister of Energy at the time, pointed to an expected price increase by 
some 3 %. Later on, NEC came out with new arguments, claiming that because 
of the coal price increase the price of electricity had to go up by 15 %  in July 
2006. But the real share of coal in the prime cost of electricity revealed that such 
an increase of the price of electricity would correspond to soaring of coal prices 
by 50 to 60 percent, which was far from reality. The growing speculations with the 
estimated costs for the maintenance of de-commissioned nuclear reactors have a 
similar purpose. But the annual reports of Kozoldui NPP outline a different picture 
of the costs needed to maintain operating reactors. About 30 % of the costs go 
for nuclear fuel. 18 % of the sales revenues are remitted to the special funds. 
Depreciation costs account for some 23 %. They discontinue when reactors are 
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closed down. Another 15 % are labour costs and 16 % are operational costs and 
they should be greatly reduced after the decommissioning of the units.
Such speculations are intended to justify the demands for increases in the 
electricity price. Given the lack of economic and financial grounds, many experts 
are of the opinion that such demands reflect corrupt interests. Ultimately, this has 
lad to a situation in which the prices of electricity for individuals and businesses 
are higher in Bulgaria than in many European countries.18
Second, the sector is strongly dependent on the energy sources supplied 
under monopoly import terms and conditions. The local entities enjoying the 
trust and confidence of energy suppliers actually dominate the domestic market. 
It is not difficult for them to create the impression that there is no alternative to 
their involvement in the transactions. Since the energy imports depend on many 
geopolitical factors, one can assert that the energy market is characterized by 
strong political influences and it is a field of conflicts among divergent economic 
interests. This has a peculiar impact on the domestic energy market. Political and 
economic circles take shape in close connection with countries producing energy 
sources and with corporate structures dominating in them. Their success results 
from the penetration into the highest political circles over time, regardless of 
their political affiliation, on the one hand, and on the other, on their connections 
to the external energy suppliers who are typically linked to the highest political 
circles in their own countries. It is at this level that the influence of the business 
environment structured in this particular way is exerted on the energy security in 
the country and the region. Thus, the importation of energy sources becomes a 
serious channel for political influence coming from outside. Besides, the monopoly 
position of importers gives them the opportunity to apply prices exceeding those 
of the international markets.
Quite indicative in this respect is the importation of nuclear fuel for Kozlodui 
NPP. Each year one-third of the fuel in the reactors is to be replaced. Units 5 
and 6 of the power plant need some 55 tons of fresh fuel on an annual basis. 
The only producer of nuclear fuel for this type of reactors is Russia. Furthermore, 
nuclear fuel is imported through intermediaries and the contract was amended 
to the detriment of the Bulgarian side a few years ago. As a result, the nuclear 
power plant purchases the Russian fuel at a price which is about 22 % higher 
than that of the international markets.19 Besides, the Russian nuclear fuel is 
known to be of poorer quality than the fuel offered by Western producers. 
However, that was not an obstacle for the nuclear power plant which signed a 
supply agreement valid until 2020.
Third, the issue of the export of electricity is similar, although with a reverse 
logic. Here again, intermediaries are involved and the professional community 
believes that there is no way to avoid them.  
18 See the interview of Commissioner Andris Piebalgs to the Macedonian newspaper Dnevnik 
published in November 2005, where he wondered how people in the Balkan countries managed 
to pay their electricity bills because electricity prices were often higher than those in the EU 
countries.
19 Banker weekly, No. 23, 10 – 16 June 2006.
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However, it should be noted that actually NEC carried out the export of electricity 
on its own several years ago. The practice of a widespread use of intermediaries 
has become quite common for the last few years. NEC officially announced that 
exports were carried out mainly through intermediaries for the first time in its 2004 
annual report, which read that “the quantity of the electricity exported in 2004 
through traders in electric power accounted for 81.3 % of the total exports”. In 2005, 
almost 90 % of the exports passed through intermediaries. There exist no economic 
justifications for this situation because, in practice, NEC holds the monopoly on the 
purchase of electricity for export purposes; it has full monopoly over the high-voltage 
network that is used to bring the electricity to the neighbouring countries to which 
the exports are almost exclusively oriented. 
In general, intermediaries in the export of electricity belong to the same business 
circles which control the importation of energy sources. This has become possible 
because the export of electricity is launched in public as a strategic business project 
of Bulgaria. Many economic analyses prove that the prospects might not be so 
bright for this type of exports since the exports comply with a standard in shrinking 
demand.
Besides, the size of the NEC revenues from exports is far below the levels of a 
strategic national priority. In 2004, for instance, exports accounted for 17.2 % of 
the electricity generated and provided 18.2 % of the revenues.20 Had it been true 
that NEC made a large profit from the export of electricity, exports would have 
generated, say, 30 - 40 % of the revenues. The NEC annual reports for 2004 and 
2005 reveal that the average export price per kWh of NEC was less than 0.1 eurocent 
 
 
NEC carries out the transmission, import and export of electricity and the traditional export markets are the 
countries on the Balkan Peninsula. For the last few years, this most profitable activity has been in the hands of 
private traders in electricity. In 2003, the annual report of NEC pointed to exports of 5.45 billion kWh but did 
not specify the percentage of exports through intermediaries. In 2005, exports amounted to 7.6 billion kWh (2005 
Annual Report of NEC) and the share of intermediaries was not specified. At its meeting held on 29 June 2006, the 
Parliamentary Anti-corruption Committee examined a NEC letter which made it clear that 90 % of the exports in 
2005 were carried out through intermediaries. The names of the private exporters were not mentioned and NEC 
explained their involvement with the willingness of the electric companies in the neighbouring countries to work 
with intermediaries and also with the claim that NEC could not afford deferred payments for 60 days and therefore 
it could not win in public tenders. The NEC annual reports make it clear that the revenues of NEC from exports 
were 3.1 eurocents per kWh on the average. On 30 November 2006, Focus Agency quoted the Macedonian daily 
Dnevnik which reported the following: “The bidders in the public tender for importation of electricity offered to 
supply only a half of the quantity of electricity that Macedonia needs. The Macedonian electric transmission system 
operator (MEPCO) wants to purchase 0.862 billion kWh to meet the needs of the country until the end of April 
2007. The lowest bid quoted 5.6 eurocents per kWh in April and 8.98 eurocents per kWh in the winter months.” 
Obviously the price differential is at least 0.5 eurocents per kWh and it may well reach over 6 eurocents in the 
winter months. Even in “the worst scenario” from the perspective of intermediaries, the difference would amount 
to some € 35 million or close to 70 million levs. These are the revenues which NEC gives up (although they are 
bigger than the profit reported in 2005) and leaves them to intermediaries.
Box 1. Export of electricity
20 See 2004 Annual Report of NEC.
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above the price on the domestic market, in spite of the much higher price on the 
international market. Undoubtedly, such practices are harmful to the state-owned 
enterprise, to the government budget and to the consumers but they are beneficial 
to the intermediaries. 
The need for intermediaries is justified in various ways but, most frequently, it is 
done as a result of their greater flexibility and ability to adapt more easily to the 
market requirements in comparison to NEC. For instance, intermediaries claim to 
be capable of offering deferred payment of 60 days for the supply of electricity 
to their customers, while NEC is believed to be unable to do so. If there was an 
export contract though, any commercial bank would be prepared to lend to NEC. 
The argument that the use of intermediaries contribute to the market liberalization 
process is similar. It is claimed further that “companies in the neighbouring countries 
are willing to work with intermediaries”.21 However, it is perfectly clear that if NEC 
were a private company, it would not allow any single kWh to be exported by a 
competitor.
Fourth, the sector is characterized by high technical and environmental risks 
and it affects the national security. All this naturally supports the arguments 
about restricting the access to information and to the debates on technological 
issues. In many cases, it is possible for information to be concealed without 
any sanction through its unjustified classification. This is particularly relevant 
to nuclear energy. The Law on the Safe Use of Nuclear Energy puts safety on 
top of the agenda for understandable reasons. Article 3, para 2 reads that 
“in the use of nuclear energy and ionizing radiation and in the radioactive 
waste management nuclear safety and radiation protection shall have priority 
over any other aspect of these activities”. This creates a substantial loophole 
for awarding public procurement contracts without any competition or even 
without any formal procedure. Thus, all other aspects of the public interest 
can be sacrificed in the name of safety without sanctions, including such 
aspects as cost efficiency, openness, transparency, competition and etiquette. 
The reference to safety has turned into a mantra in the nuclear energy sector 
which is not subject to discussion. It turns out that the legal provisions quoted 
above become the universal excuse for the violation or neglect of other laws 
or rules of ethics.
The high public and international sensitivity to nuclear safety issues turns into 
justification for the frequent and sometimes uncontrolled increase of the costs 
of Kozlodui NPP. The data from the annual reports of the nuclear power plant 
show that the prime cost was 0.034 levs per kWh in 2001. In 2002 (prior to the 
closing down of Units 1 and 2), it increased by as much as 15 %. The same rate 
was reported in 2003, reaching 0.044 levs. Throughout the period there was no 
increase of the prices of metals or nuclear energy, the exchange rate of the U.S. 







21  See Minutes from the meeting of the Parliamentary Anti-corruption Committee, 29 June 2006. 
A representative of NEC justified the need for intermediaries in the following way: “When state-
owned companies in the neighbouring countries, to which we exported about 10 %, and these 
are the companies of Macedonia, Serbia, Greece, Kosovo and Croatia, are no longer willing to 
buy, I want to ask whether the remaining 90 % of the output generated by our facilities should 
stay like monuments or their output should be sold somewhere”.
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utilized and staffing levels were reduced. Nevertheless, the prices of nuclear 
energy continued to grow in Bulgaria. The only plausible explanation could be 
investments in safety, although EU grants worth millions were allocated for that 
purpose. The comparison to the financial performance of nuclear power plants 
of the same type in market economies points to inefficiency of the generation 
of nuclear power instead. The operational costs of U.S. nuclear power plants 
were about $ 0.016 per kWh on a net basis in 2004. The operational costs 
of French nuclear power plants were even lower. The adjustment to identical 
terms reveals that the operational costs of Kozlodui NPP were approximately 
40 % higher than those of U.S. nuclear power plants. Such large discrepancies 
could hardly be explained by economic arguments because the costs incurred 
for nuclear fuel, materials, spare parts and others in the nuclear energy sector 
are at international prices and few of them are specific. 
The energy experts in Bulgaria are not that many and they could hardly 
be called independent. Almost all of them are employed in the sector or 
provide consultancy services to it. The need for adequate expertise makes the 
participation of the non-governmental sector and the general public in the 
public debate very difficult, especially when the issue at stake is the making 
of crucial decisions with far-reaching consequences. In fact, civil society is 
allowed to take part in the discussion of only two sets of issues: the protection 
of the environment and the expediency of the closing down of the first units 
of Kozoldui NPP. This situation is also made worse by the underdeveloped 
consumer protection mechanisms and the lack of legal remedies against decisions 
of great importance to society. The expert parlance and the closed nature of 
the system make it difficult for external institutions to exercise control and to 
prove the liability in formal court proceedings. Any attempt at proving some 
violation would inevitably grow into a technical debate on the expediency of 
one or another decision. The bodies which administer justice would practically 
be unable to find independent and unbiased experts capable to justify it. 
All this is particularly relevant to experts in the nuclear sector. They enjoy 
relatively high trust and confidence by the general public. The debate on the 
closing down of Units 3 and 4 of Kozlodui NPP and the construction of Belene 
NPP was actually diverted from economic expediency and chanelled into 
abstract national interest deliberations. The arguments that were put forward 
sought to appeal to infringed national pride or a professed concern about 
higher prices hurting the consumer. The discussion on the price of the electricity 
generated by the nuclear power plant held at the expert level was not reported 
in the media in a way that could be comprehensible to consumers. Thus 
the arguments that nuclear energy was not the cheapest one and it could 
even prove to be the most expensive, taking into consideration most of the 
decommissioning costs and other price-formative factors, including the price of 
attracted financial resources over time, did not reach the public. Technically, 
this process has been going on for decades; the personnel of the nuclear 
power plant is numerous and the nuclear waste is not stored or disposed of 
free of charge. Both the public opinion and the media were not impressed by 
the disclosed data or the lack of explanation of the depreciation allowances at 
the nuclear power plant or the continuous growth of the investment in facilities 
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subject to closure or the lack of clear explanations of the exact price of the 
electricity generated there.22
Finally, whether privatization could be a solution to these risks is a key issue. 
Privatization per se cannot resolve efficiency problems against a non-existing 
market competition, particularly given the public mistrust in its transparency. 
Still, what makes corrupt practices in the privatization of the energy sector 
different from those in the other sectors of the economy? Given that a 
sizeable portion of the market is monopolized, it is not so much a matter of 
corruption in the privatization process but an opportunity for corrupt practices 
in the private monopoly under inefficient state regulation. A large percentage 
of potential buyers with predominant or exclusive government stake (although 
some state-owned enterprises are public) is typical for the energy sector. In fact, 
the old schemes of government officials draining resources out of the energy 
enterprises are being replaced by schemes to be applied by foreign officials. 
If the main objectives of the privatization are to promote the market and 
enhance efficiency through the involvement of the private sector, this legislative 
approach should be defined as inadequate, to say the least. The ‘novelty’ is 
that the same companies that controlled both the input and the output of 
state enterprises are still involved but now as intermediaries in the import and 
export of raw materials and electricity. Their earlier incarnation as consultants 
in the privatization process was substituted by them being import or export 
intermediaries. The reason for this adaptation is related to their continued 
influence in SEWRC and MEE.
An indirect indicator of the quality of buyers is the price offered for the 
facilities to be privatized. In the course of the 15-year-long history of the 
Bulgarian privatization, there have been no other cases when packages of 
shares had price quotation differences of dozens of times at the same point of 
time. This could mean that either the buyers count on fundamentally different 
development strategies for the privatized company and, as a result, bids differ 
as much as 1:30 or more, or that they have no clear idea of the management 
of a private company or that unequal treatment is involved and some bidders 
have more information at their disposal than others. The problem is that the 
Law on the Privatization and the Post-privatization control does not allow 
participation of Bulgarian buyers with predominant state or municipal stake 
but it allows participation of buyers with predominant state interest from other 
countries. It is no surprise that the only facilities suitable for privatization and 
for attracting foreign investment have turned out to be the several larger electric 
distribution companies. Of course, their attitude to businesses and consumers 
cannot be substantially different from that of the state-owned companies. They 
turned to be the convenient culprits for the growing electricity prices and the 
energy shortages which have occurred in some regions. Thus they unwittingly 
became a convenient excuse for the excessive expenditures in the power 
plants and in the transmission phase at the expense of the consumers. The 





22 The price should be the sum total of two components – one for the facilities and one for the 
generation of electricity. It should be identical to the electricity purchase price but this is not 
the case in reality and there are no satisfactory explanations to this effect.
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and foreign capital, where foreign interests are sometimes represented by 
state-owned enterprises (including a publicly quoted one), whereas domestic 
capital does not enjoy the trust and confidence of the general public. The 
only exceptions are the several electric distribution and district heating 
companies. On the other hand, since NEC and Bulgargas are on the list of 
companies that are not to be privatized for years to come, the attempts to 
privatize certain elements of their operations - such as the exports of electricity 
in the case of NEC – are of increasing interest. 
In this context, an issue of considerable public interest is whether privatization 
is appropriate if it only leads only to the replacement of domestic corrupt 
practices by foreign ones beyond the jurisdiction of the Bulgarian state and 
often also beyond that of the European Union. This also sets international anti-
corruption efforts in an entirely new context. It is perfectly possible for the 
management of a Bulgarian enterprise to be involved in foreign corrupt schemes 
but affecting mainly and only the interests of Bulgarian consumers. The simplest 
case is the public procurement at a local enterprise, where corruption takes 
place abroad and hence the Bulgarian law enforcement authorities are unable 
to prevent or prosecute it. One of the possible illustrations refers primarily to 
the public procurement of imported energy sources. 
3.2.  PUBLIC PROCUREMENT IN THE ENERGY SECTOR
The energy sector has always made huge investments in comparison to the other 
sectors of the economy, regardless of the economic condition of the country. 
According to a survey of the Bulgarian Energy Chamber, energy enterprises have 
planned investments of 1,178 million levs which is 150 % more than the level 
in 2006 (Table 4).
The general public does not always have access to information about the need 
for and the expected effect from these investments. In some cases, they are 
necessary and justified in terms of their type but not in terms of their amount. 
Table 4.  Growth of investments in the energy 
sector 2006 – 2007 (mln levs)
2006 2007
Kozlodui NPP 82 100
NEC 243 412
Generation of electricity 197 357
Distribution of electricity 200 280
District heating companies 52 29
Total 774 1,178
Source: Bulgarian Energy Chamber. 
Currently, for instance, the harmonization with the EU environmental protection 
standards is underway. Even the most conservative estimates point to hundreds 
of millions of Euros. The adjustment involves the construction of desulphurization 
systems in all thermal power plants and this measure enjoys sufficient public 
approval. However, there is always the risk even for the most appropriate measures 
to create favorable conditions for abuse so that to substantially exceed the real 
expenditures needed. Energy investment projects are typically quite expensive. 
Their average price is many times higher than that in the other sectors. The value 
of an ordinary turbine, for example, is equal to at least the value of several new 
hotels at the Black Sea coast, together with the value of the land, the equipment 
and the furniture. It is easy to conceal corrupt payments in such projects which 
most frequently go through the ubiquitous consultants. The value and nature of 
these projects inevitably call for the involvement of an engineer consultant who 
exercises a number of delegated state control functions as prescribed by law. 
It is only natural for these large investments in the sector to have at least three 
energy companies ranking among the largest contracting authorities under the LPP 
and RSPP. According to the data from the Public Procurement Agency, in terms 
of the value of the public procurement contracts awarded over the period from 
2004 and 2006, those were NEC EAD; Maritsa-East Mines EAD, Radnevo; Maritsa-
East 2 TPP, and Kozoldui NPP (Appendix 1). These four companies have awarded 
contracts worth more than 8.5 billion levs for the last three years, accounting 
for 77% of the total value of the public procurement contracts awarded by the 
top ten contracting authorities for the same period. Since, according to the same 
data, about two-thirds (66.5%) of the total value of public procurement are 
contracted by sectoral contracting authorities, it can be concluded that energy 
companies have structural significance for the public procurement sector and 
they have appropriate feedback mechanisms to influence the market of certain 
supplies, services and construction works. Besides, one should remember that 
the available data refer only to the public procurement contracts awarded under 
the LPP and RSPP. The law provides for the option to award contracts without 
holding public procurement procedures under certain thresholds.
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The risk of awarding unfavorable public procurement contracts is higher in the 
energy sector than elsewhere. The reasons lie in the existing monopoly over the 
distribution of electricity, heating and gas; the special market and PR significance 
of nuclear energy; the greater technical risks and the priority of nuclear safety 
over all other operational, legal and economic aspects (Art. 3, para 2 Law on the 
Safe Use of Nuclear Energy); the closed and non-transparent price formation and 
approval and regulation of the sector as a whole; the large scale of the main 
producers, etc. The sector does not have the practice of calculating the effect 
of some public procurement or technical project on the basis of the end result. 
Generally, the application of formal criteria to the technical specifications leads, 
deliberately or not, to unfavorable end results. Investments are rarely evaluated, 
while taking into account the full range of efficiency criteria in the energy sector: 
the value per unit of output capacity for the whole period of operation of the 
facilities plus the reliability of the equipment (actually, the full life cycle). For 
instance, when nuclear fuel is supplied, the price is calculated on the basis of 
metric units rather than the quantity of energy they can generate.   
 
 
Experts are of the opinion that in the case of many investment projects in the 
energy sector the price per 1 MW of installed or rehabilitated capacity is much 
higher than the price in similar or more developed countries. Unless the opposite 
is convincingly justified and supported by official numbers, this would be a clear 
sign of the amount of public resources abused. In such cases, society suffers 
Source: PPA.
Kozoldui NPP conducted a public procurement tender for the supply of nuclear fuel. That happened in a more 
or less competitive environment and it was possible to reach a favorable price. The contract was awarded to the 
Russian company Tver which offered fuel of the lowest technical category at a price which was 20 % higher than the 
international price. That became possible because of the way in which the technical specifications were formulated in 
the  public tender. The price bids were calculated and compared in terms of the quantity of fuel supplied rather than 
the quantity of energy it could generate. 
Box 2. Supply of nuclear fuel for Kozlodui NPP
Total for the period 1 October 
2004 – 30 June 2006
Number of tenders 
announced
Number of contracts 
awarded
Value of the contracts 
awarded
Total 2,139 2,239 9,078,854,031
Construction works 328 320 8,165,029,124
Supplies 1,055 1,112 520,043,553
Services 756 807 393,781,353
Table 5.  Number and value of public procurement contracts in the 
energy sector (1 October 2004 – 30 June 2006) (levs)
Source: See Verbatim Report – Minutes No. 31 of 29 June 2006 of the Parliamentary Anti-corruption Committee and the sources 
quoted there.
double damage: taxpayers pay these amounts through overt or covert forms of 
state subsidies or guarantees in the form of government commitments to provide 
support and cover costs and then all electricity consumers pay once again. 
The appraisal of projects on the basis of price/capacity/duration/environmental 
effects/costs is not applied to the process of making decisions of great importance 
for the national economy. The competition among potential partners, suppliers or 
contractors is thus even less encouraged.
3.3. FORMS OF ABUSE
Several main types of deviation from the rules of ethics and economic expediency 
can be discerned in the public procurement in the energy sector. Some of them 
can be defined also as unlawful, while others formally comply with the letter 
of the law but they lead to damage which is compensated by distributing the 
loss among consumers. The main types of violations and deviations in the public 
procurement in the energy sector are as follows:
• opening of public procurement procedures which are not expedient (do 
not meet public needs) in order to spend resources or to ensure personal 
benefit; 
• selection of negotiations regardless of the options to hold a more competitive 
procedure and/or a non-professional team;
• deliberate manipulation of the procedure and the related documentation, 
including its unnecessary complications or ambiguities;
• deliberate manipulation of the requirements to the bidders; inadequate 
qualification criteria, requirements for experience, certification and technical 
requirements;
• exertion of administrative or political pressure to hire certain subcontractors or 
to guide the decisions of the administrative staff of the contracting authority;
In 1998, Maritsa-East 2 TPP announced a public procurement procedure for the supply and installation of a turbine. The 
selection was carried out at NEC EAD by a committee appointed by the Board of Directors of NEC. The appointment 
was confirmed by a decision of the Board of Directors of the company because, at that time, Maritsa-East 2 TPP was 
a branch of NEC. The principal gave its approval. The winner offered experimental equipment without the necessary 
guarantees. The purchased turbine could not be set into operation in the course of several years after its supply and 
installation. As a result of that inaction of the company, huge damage was caused due to the failure to generate power. 
The contractor could not be made to compensate for the damage since the contract did not contain such clauses. The 
only option left was to seek remedy pursuant to the general provisions for compensation under Art. 45 of the Law on 
Obligations and Contracts, requiring proof of the amount of the damage incurred. There is no available evidence to prove 
that it was done and, meanwhile, the statute of limitation for that damage expired. 
Box 3. Supply of equipment for Maritsa-East 2 TPP
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• exertion of pressure on the contractor through the procedure for 
payments;
• deliberate creation of unequal treatment or prerequisites for inequality or 
unfair competition among the bidders; 
• breach of trust and disclosure of information.23
Some typical violations are related to the decision to hold and announce 
procedures.24 The others involve deliberate errors in the opening of the procedure 
so that to provide grounds for its discontinuation if the best bid comes from an 
“unwelcome” candidate. In such cases, it is found out before the end of the 
procedure that financial resources are unavailable. These procedural maneuvers 






23 Relations of trust often occur in the public procurement sphere on the basis of information 
protected by law. The excessive expansion or restriction of the requirements to the documentation 
in this connection could lead to abuse to the detriment of the contractor.
24 Just a short excerpt from the catalogue: wording of the subject-matter of the procedure in 
a misleading way or in a way which does not fully correspond to the nature of the public 
procurement; establishment of unjustified or obscure criteria related to the qualifications; 
introduction of requirements for experience in spheres of little practical relevance; requirements 
for experience on a scale which is obviously irrelevant to the volume and nature of the contract; 
requirements for certification under a less known certification scheme (prior to the amendments 
to Arts. 30 to 33 LPP); excessively long validity term of the bids against the backdrop of dynamic 
market developments; too stringent technical requirements based on the catalogue of a certain 
manufacturer or bidder; excessively high and stringent requirements to the qualifications of 
the staff; too complicated procedure for obtaining the documentation; explanations on the 
content of the documentation, when the answers obviously do not cover the questions or come 
just before the deadline for the submission of the bids when essential aspects are clarified; 
unduly complicated or obscure procedure for submission of the bids, etc. Non-governmental 
organizations have gathered information on some of these practices.
 
In 1998, a contract was concluded in connection with the modernization of Units 5 and 6 of Kozoldui NPP. 
The initial price of the contract was $8 million (which increased subsequently to $24 million by 2004, which 
was indicative of the problem with the efficiency of public procurement and the justification of the costs). The 
contract was signed with a company which was registered specifically for that purpose and no public tender was 
held. Furthermore, the subcontractors would also to be selected on a non-competitive basis, regardless of the 
high price of the project and the enhanced public interest. It was perfectly lawful because the documentation 
did not envisage such a requirement. The issue of the modernization costs for Units 3 and 4 of Kozlodui NPP 
after the agreement between the Government of Bulgaria and the EU on their closing down was discussed 
also by the Parliamentary Anti-corruption Committee. According to the information made available there, the 
post-2001 costs for the two units amounted to some $180 million and they would continue until 2009. 
The problem would have hardly reached the Bulgarian general public without the inquiry of the European 
Commission into the modernization programs and the residual resource management programs until 2009. 
Box 4. The Modernization of Kozoldui NPP
Source:  Minutes No. 31 of 29 June 2006 of the meeting of the Committee; Capital weekly, No. 45 of 2006
The evasion of a competitive public procurement procedure has a long history. 
A typical example under the earlier versions of the LPP was the awarding of 
contracts for services labeled as R&D. That has become much more difficult 
under the latest version of the law. Still, the specific features of the energy sector 
facilitate the evasion of compliance. The factors which contribute to this situation 
are as follows: the above mentioned Art. 3, para 2 of the Law on the Safe Use 
of Nuclear Energy; the technological monopoly over many supplies (e.g. nuclear 
fuel or spare parts); the electricity export arrangements, and so on. 
The tendency for less competitive public procurement procedures in the energy 
sector can be seen in the relatively high percentage - about 40 % of all 
procedures - of negotiations with or without announcement (Table 6). 
Table 6 makes it clear that 51.3 % of all public procurement procedures in the 
energy sector involved negotiations with our without announcement under the 
LPP, including accelerated procedures, and invitations under the RSPP. If contracts 
concluded without any public procurement procedure are added it becomes 
clear that the erosion of market competition is the rule rather than the exception. 
This conclusion is supported also by the use of the commodity exchange trading 
by the sectoral contracting authorities. Most of the public procurement contracts 
in the energy sector are supplies of energy sources. They can easily be purchased 
on the commodity exchanges in Bulgaria and abroad. It seems, however, that this 
procedure is assiduously avoided, in spite of the detailed regulation set out in the 
The Council of Ministers adopted a decision dated 29 April 2004 to approve the report of the Minister of Energy 
and Energy Resources on the construction of a nuclear power plant in Belene and to instruct the relevant ministers 
to hold negotiations with the potential investors and financial institutions to sign the project implementation 
contracts. The type of procedure chosen - even leaving aside the problems with the expediency of such a project 
started without any public debate – was a case in point. No explanations were given as to why the biggest ever 
public procurement in Bulgaria (7.82 billion levs) would be awarded through the non-competitive procedure of 
negotiations. Thus the Ministry of the Environment and Waters approved the construction of a 2,000 MW facility on 
the basis of the light water technology. It provided opportunities for broadening the scope of potential bidders. At 
the same time, however, NEC announced a procedure only for Russian reactors of the WWER type, excluding the 
Western light-water type of reactors. That was a typical case of manipulated public procurement documentation 
and the technical specifications in particular to the benefit of a certain bidder or certain bidders. But the most 
important thing was the restriction of competition.
The government institutions rejected those arguments and stated that the documentation did not mention Russian 
reactors and that the equipment already supplied on the site of Belene was manufactured by Skoda, the Czech 
Republic. A public tender was announced for the completion of units 1 and the construction of unit 2 on the basis 
of the light-water technology. Theoretically, at least four manufacturers could participate. The procedure offered 
three options: bids for the whole plant or separately for the nuclear and non-nuclear part and another one for 
the fuel. Still, the only bidders were two companies producing WWER type reactors only. Following the selection 
of the foretold winner the NEC stated that for security and economic reasons it had been decided to construct 
entirely new units rather than the completion of the first two. These considerations had been, however, pointed 
out by experts two years earlier and they should have led to a tender for all types of light water reactors not 
only WWER.
Box 5. Belene NPP
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LPP Implementing Rules which leave no grounds for doubt as to their lawfulness. 
According to the data from the Public Procurement Agency, the number of public 
procurement procedures in the energy sector through commodity exchange 
transactions was 16 out of a total of 2,139 over the period from 1 October 
2004 to 30 June 2006, i.e. they accounted for only 0.7%. One of the reasons is 
perhaps the limited corruption potential of commodity exchange transactions due 
to the lack of direct contact between the buyer and the supplied in the course 
of the negotiations.
3.4. ABUSE IN THE CONSULTING AND INTERMEDIARY SERVICES IN THE 
ENERGY SECTOR
The sector has the practice of awarding public procurement contracts that 
cannot be justified on any essential technical, economic or other public grounds. 
Consultancy services deserve special attention from the perspective of efficiency 
and benefit as they are most difficult to quantify (or evaluate in qualitative 
terms) and therefore sectoral contracting authorities have special liking for these 
services. The reason is that the value of human resources is not analyzed 
in such procedures. The main costs in consultancy are the labor costs and 
the costs related to the servicing of the personnel (transportation, office costs, 
communications, information services, accommodation). All material costs are 
easily comparable in the competitive bids. Fees, however, are allowed to vary a 
Source: PPA.
2004 2005 2006 Total Share 
(%)
Number of public procurement procedures, including: 138 1,220 781 2,139 100 
Open procedures under the LPP 48 268 151 467 21.8
Restricted procedures under the LPP 0 3 3 6 0.3
Accelerated restricted procedures under the LPP 0 0 0 0 0
Negotiations with announcement under the LPP 15 282 225 522 24.4
Accelerated negotiations with announcement under the LPP 3 12 2 17 0.8
Negotiations without announcement under the LPP 14 191 114 319 14.9
Open competitive bidding under the RSPP 43 269 175 487 22.8
Public tender under the RSPP 0 2 2 4 0.2
Negotiations by invitation under the RSPP 15 155 70 240 11.2
Commodity exchange transaction under the RSPP 0 13 3 16 0.7
Short-listing system and preliminary announcement – 
invitation
0 25 36 61 2.9
Competitive dialogue 0 0 0 0 0.0
Table 6.  Public procurement in the energy sector by types of  
procedures (October 2004 – June 2006)
lot and are typically calculated in the form of person-days or hours. The problem 
in the energy sector is that a detailed analysis would point to either incredibly 
expensive labor per unit of time or too long work with too much staff or both. 
If the requirements to the bidders and the technical specifications were worded 
accurately, the competition among the bids would be mainly price-based and 
ultimately consultancy services would drastically reduce their value, as is in fact 
the case on the free market. But in the energy sector the market for consultancy 
services cannot be considered free because of the lack of serious competition, 
the reasons for which are subjective rather than objective. 
The practice of organizing and holding public procurement procedures with 
the sole purpose of ensuring income for the contractor is quite common. The 
compliance with the European environmental protection and safety standards 
provide favorable conditions for corrupt practices, including those in the supply of 
goods and construction works. Thus the corruption potential in the energy sector 
is the highest among all spheres of the public sector. The problem is that there 
is no authority to decide which contract for the supply of goods or services was 
necessary and which was not. With regard to big contracts this function could be 
performed by SEWRC in the course of the review of the annual business plans 
of energy enterprises. The latter should have the obligation to submit their public 
procurement plans for each calendar year with the related justifications and cost 
plans.
The representatives of the energy sector justify the involvement of consultants in 
the development and implementation of large-scale projects with the existence of 
such a requirement in most loan agreements. On the other hand, they refer to 
the requirement under the Law on Spatial Planning and Development to have such 
consultants. In other words, officials in the energy sector argue publicly that they 
had no choice but to make big projects more expensive and, in spite of all their 
claims for high professional level, they could not possibly develop their projects 
without external consultants. 
In connection with the Belene NPP, NEC signed two initial contracts: one for the preparation of an environmental 
impact assessment and the other one for a feasibility study for the purposes of drafting the report to the Standing 
Committee for Energy at the National Assembly. The contracts were signed with Parsons E&C Europe Ltd. The 
price was set at about $7.7 million. The media reported that the price of previous studies with similar content 
was approximately $150 thousand. When labor input costs were re-calculated according to the generally accepted 
rates (in the United States and Europe) for external experts, the price of the contracts was estimated to be not 
more than $1 million. A possible explanation of that drastic difference is that the contractors were selected without 
any procedure under the LPP. The ironic remark of one of the experts was that “there is no law to prevent NEC 
from spending 50 times more of the money of Bulgarian consumers of electricity”.25
  Box 6. The EIA procedure for Belene NPP
25 Mathew Brunwasser, The Long Way to Belence or Why Only Petty Violations are Punished, available 
online at http://mediapool.bg/site/project/files/belene.shtml.
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The consultancy market in the energy sector is dominated by several linked 
companies (Appendix 3). The situation with the exporters of electricity is similar with 
some major companies being the key players in both sectors. The monopolization 
of both markets is inconceivable without the active support of the leadership 
in the sector and the main energy enterprises which, in turn, generates corrupt 
practices. The problem in this case is that the distortion and circumvention of 
public procurement procedures lead to less competition.
The usual position of government institutions with regard to the monopolization 
of the market for consultancy and intermediary services is that there are no 
companies holding dominant position. They substantiate it by referring to market 
shares as percentages of the total turnover or the total number of contracts per 
contractor. What is omitted in these arguments is that some companies, which 
are public procurement contractors, are linked to each other and so are their 
subcontractors. More often than not, relationship schemes generate conflicts 
of interest, although manifested in different public procurement contracts. The 
reason is that the same company may act as the contractor under different 
public procurement contracts but within the same investment project or with 
the same contracting authority. Sometimes the government administration acting 
as the principal and the sectoral contracting authorities cite opposite arguments. 
They claim that the range of experts and consulting companies is very narrow 
and this naturally limits their choice. This, however, raises the question why some 
consulting companies win public procurement tenders abroad but they cannot 
win in Bulgaria. And conversely, why the most successful bidders in Bulgaria do 
not have the same success in other countries?
Maritsa-East 2 TPP announced a public procurement procedure to select a consultant under the Law on Spatial 
Planning and Development for its ongoing investment project – rehabilitation of unit 1 to 6 and construction of 
desulphurization installations at units 1 to 4. Three candidates submitted their bids. The most beneficial bid at a 
price of about €9 million was filed by the US company C&L Engineers Limited in consortium with Energoproject AD, 
Sofia, which had no ongoing projects in the sector. After the bids were opened, the contracting authority discontinued 
the procedure pointing out the reason that it had no resources. The termination of the procedure was appealed by 
Parsons E&S Ltd. which had been eliminated. The decision of the contracting authority was reversed by the Regional 
Court of Stara Zagora and the reversal of the decision was subsequently confirmed also by the Supreme Administrative 
Court. Several months later – already in the following calendar year - a new procedure was announced and the 
wording of the service sought was modified only slightly remaining identical to the previous one in its essence. There 
was only one bid from Parsons E&C Ltd. which failed to win in the earlier procedure. The company held a sizeable 
portion of the market for such services and the price of its bid was about €18 million or twice higher than the bid 
of the other participant eliminated in the earlier procedure. This time the authorities had no difficulty in providing 
the financial resources although they were much greater in size than before. The only bidder Parsons E&C Ltd. was 
announced to be the winner and a contract was signed at the price quoted in its bid.
Box 7. Procedure for the selection of a consultant for Maritsa-
East 2 TPP
Source:  Administrative Case No. 298/2004, Decision No.298/21 January 2004 of the Regional Court of Stara Zagora and the 
materials in administrative case No. 4245/2005 and Decision No. 9115/19 October 2005 of the Supreme Administrative 
Court, 4th Division
3.5. ANTI-CORRUPTION MEASURES IN PUBLIC PROCUREMENT IN THE 
ENERGY SECTOR
An important prerequisite for the limitation of corrupt practices in the energy 
sector is the existence of a comprehensive national energy strategy and the 
optimization of the energy balance on this basis; the compilation of a list of the 
strategic facilities of national importance in the energy sector and the need for 
new production capacities. All this calls for a genuine public debate because it 
will involve the spending of billions of taxpayers and consumers levs (including 
the sovereign guarantees) in the next 10 to 15 years. 
Government officials should be subjected to continuous public pressure to fully 
exercise their rights of the principal in the companies generating electricity and 
heating. This includes comprehensive monitoring and control, including court 
remedies sought by the government as the shareholder against the management 
of its own companies. Such an option is envisaged in the Commercial Code but 
there is no evidence that it has ever been invoked. For this to happen, new 
obligations - together with non-compliance penalties - should be introduced for 
the principals. This could be done in the Regulation on the Exercising of the Rights of 
the Government in the Companies with State Interest.26 At present, the Regulation (Art. 
11, subpara 12) envisages only the right but not the obligation of the company 
to seek damages from the manager or the comptroller as a prerogative of the 
sole owner of the capital. SEWRC should be empowered to exercise real control 
over the business plans of electricity producers. The Commission still fails to 
demonstrate a capacity for economic analysis which makes unjustified or poorly 
justified price increases possible. It is efficiency, i.e. the ultimate effect in the 
money/capacity/environmental effect ratio that can and must underlie price 
increase assumptions.
A serious debate should be initiated among the experts as to the efficiency of 
the existing production capacities. It is necessary to analyze the cost per unit of 
installed capacities and then calculate and add the costs for servicing financial 
arrangements and for building the requisite infrastructure.27 Only then the cost 
can be compared to similar projects abroad so that the gauge the efficiency and 
public benefit of the respective project.
The introduction of a public monitoring system of procurement in the energy 
sector is urgent. For this purpose, a model should be developed and proposed to 
the government. This could be done by the non-governmental sector, including the 











26 Adopted with CoM Ordinance No. 112 of 23 May 2003, promulgated in The State Gazette, 
No. 51of 3 June 2003, actual entry into force on 16 February 2007. The Regulation mentions 
corporate responsibility in two cases: responsibility of the manager or liquidator in their 
management contracts and the release from responsibility as grounds for release of the 
management performance bond.
27 A well known fact is that the cost of the electricity lines (about $1 million per km on the 
average) to be established for the Belene NPP is not included in the estimates. Even without 
these financial and infrastructure costs, the price per kW of installed capacity in Belene is 
currently estimated to be about €2,000, whereas in Russia and the countries using similar 
technologies it is reported to be €1,500.
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the confidence of consumers in the energy policy; on the other, it would minimize 
the damage caused to the sector by excessively expensive or unnecessary public 
procurement contracts. It is also necessary to work out a system of indicators for 
the corruption risk in the public procurement sphere in general, and the energy 
sector in particular, which could provide the underpinnings of continuous public 
monitoring of the spending of resources in the energy sector. The analysis of the 
current practices in the public procurement and the energy sector leads to the 
conclusion that the following indicators could be initially contemplated:
• unjustified increase of the corporate expenditures of energy producers 
and electric distribution companies over a certain period. An additional 
indicator in the nuclear energy sector could be the existence of much 
higher operational costs in comparison to similar power plants in countries 
with market-based energy sector;
• undue reduction of the profit of these companies over a certain period, 
accompanied by inexplicable increase of the profitability of ancillary activities 
based on outsourcing or the profitability of contractual partners;
• immediate reshuffling of the management after parliamentary elections 
without transparent and clear reasons (as an indicator of getting hold of 
resource-intensive business entities);
• repeated public procurement procedures seeking the same service;
• unjustified termination of public procurement procedures;
• involvement of the same consultants in different roles and at different 
extent of domination of the market for consultancy services;
• systematic avoidance of commodity exchange transactions in the typical 
purchase of commodity goods;
• linkages between companies one of which is the consultant in an investment 
project, another is the buyer or the consultant in a privatization procedure, 
and still another is a contractual partner to a producer or wholesale or 
retail distributor of energy.

4. REDUCTION OF THE CORRUPTION RISK IN PUBLIC 
PROCUREMENT – BALANCING ECONOMIC AND ENFORCEMENT 
POLICIES  
As Bulgaria was preparing to meet the EU accession criteria and introduced 
several comprehensive changes to public procurement arrangements, the regime 
was generally made to comply with the EU Directives. Hence the prevailing 
opinion that the legal optimization process has been more or less completed 
as regards of the reduction of the corruption risk. The claim that the national 
legislation is basically harmonized with the acquis communautaire is to be accepted 
with some reservations. There still remain essential differences with regard to the 
legal regulation of concessions and also to the termination and cancellation of 
public procurement procedures. The harmonization with the acquis in the public 
procurement sector is not a one-off act; it is a dynamic process of reflecting the 
continuously changing market challenges in domestic legislation. For example, the 
common European regulatory standards for appeals in the public procurement 
sphere are still being adjusted. Being a full EU member, Bulgaria should already 
have its active position in the drafting of European policies.
Besides, the high levels of corruption risk and corrupt practices in this sphere 
come to show that the harmonization is not a goal for its sake but also a tool 
to reduce corruption. The harmonization of the legislation of the EU Member 
States is primarily intended to safeguard the equal treatment of suppliers and the 
free movement of goods, services, people and capital within the single market. 
Since these freedoms are related to transparency and free and fair competition, 
the harmonization produces an anti-corruption effect, too. But it cannot resolve 
the specific problems and challenges facing the governance of the public sector 
in the individual member states. Ultimately, each member state is responsible for 
the level of corruption in it. 
There are several groups of tools to reduce and prevent corruption in the process 
of awarding and implementing public procurement contracts in Bulgaria. They 
point to the possible priorities for the policy pursued in this area: 
а) optimization of the legal framework towards more transparency and 
competition in public procurement; increase of the percentage of commodity 
exchange transactions and e-tenders;
b) enhancement of the effectiveness of legal remedy and control mechanisms; 
c) strengthening the administrative capacity and more stringent requirements 
to the professional ethics of the responsible officials in the contracting 
authorities;
d) increasing the effectiveness of criminal prosecution;
e) introducing effective control over the property and income affidavits 
submitted by senior officials; 
f) optimization of the legal framework regulating the financing of political 
parties and election campaigns, including independent candidates;
g) development of legal framework regulating conflicts of interest in parliament, 
including regulation of lobbying.
In the case of most of these tools, it is necessary to foster their effectiveness and 
to bring them closer to good European practices. The opportunities for that are 
discussed below.
4.1. PROMOTING COMPETITION AND TRANSPARENCY
The general objective of the legal framework of public procurement is to ensure 
maximum competition at minimum compliance costs for the bona fide participants. 
This objective also points to what the main dimensions of the effectiveness of public 
procurement arrangements should be. In accordance with the acquis communautaire, 
the Law on Public Procurement in Bulgaria identifies three major principles underlying 
the legal framework of public procurement: openness and transparency; free 
and fair competition; equal treatment and non-discrimination. They shape the 
framework for the assessment of the effectiveness of the public procurement 
regime. The point is whether these arrangements provide maximum transparency, 
competition and equal treatment of suppliers and contractors. These criteria serve 
as a point of departure in the evaluation of the corruption risk level, as well as 
in the identification of the most vulnerable aspects of the legal framework in the 
public procurement sphere.
Over a rather short period of time, the legal framework of public procurement 
in Bulgaria went through substantial evolution towards its harmonization with the 
changing European legislation. The main thrust of the reform process was to reduce 
the barriers at the input of public procurement procedures, while optimizing 
the ex-post control and enhancing the guarantees for competition. At the same 
time, however, certain changes were carried out by providing more opportunities 
for discretionary and non-competitive selection of suppliers by the responsible 
officials.
The initial Law on the Awarding of State and Municipal Public Procurement of 1996 was 
short-lived but it can be assessed positively as the first step in the introduction 
of the legal figure of public procurement and its acceptance as an indispensable 
element of the modern organizational culture in the public administration and public 
service operators. The ongoing process of harmonization of the Bulgarian legislation 
with the acquis communautaire and the inefficiency of many legal provisions called 
for the adoption of a new Law on Public Procurement (LPP) in 1999.
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The European legislation, in turn, has also been evolving. There were four directives 
in the public procurement sphere until 2004,28 and they were entirely replaced by 
two new directives in 2004.29 The deadline for the EU Member States to adjust 
their national legislation to those directives was 31 January 2006 (the deadline 
for Bulgaria was 1 January 2007). Therefore Bulgaria had to repeatedly adjust its 
legislation to the developing acquis communautaire.
The groundwork of today’s legal framework of public procurement in Bulgaria was 
laid with the new Law on Public Procurement of 2004 (promulgated in The State 
Gazette, No. 28 of 6 April 2004; entered into force on 1 October 2004). The public 
procurement regime was considerably liberalized in accordance with the European 
legislation. For instance, the scope of application of the LPP was narrowed and 
the value thresholds were almost trebled to 1.8 million levs for construction 
works, 150 thousand levs for the supply of goods and 90 thousand levs for the 
provision of services. The contracts below these thresholds became subject to the 
easier procedural rules set out in the Regulation on Small-Scale Public Procurement 
(RSPP). Besides, the open procedure could be replaced by negotiations with a 
specific supplier under certain terms and conditions. The thresholds under the 
RSPP, below which no procedure was required, were also raised. After the changes 
in the European legislation of 2006, the LPP underwent so many and essential 
amendments (promulgated in The State Gazette, No. 37 of 5 May 2006; entered 
into force on 1 July 2006) that, for all practical purposes, we are faced now 
with the successive fourth new regulatory framework of public procurement in 
Bulgaria over the last ten years. Public procurement thresholds were modified and 
differentiated once again (Table 7).
Note:  These thresholds do not apply to public procurement contracts to be implemented outside the country either under the LPP 
or under the RSPP. Source: Center for the Study of Democracy.
Subject-matter Under the LPP Under the RSPP No formal procedures
With 3 bids Without 3 bids
Construction works Over 1,800,000 100,000 – 1,800,000 45,000 – 100,000 Below 45,000
Goods Over 150,000 30,000 –   150,000 15,000 –  30,000 Below 15,000
Services Over 90,000 30,000 –    90,000 15,000 –  30,000 Below 15,000
Design competition Over 30,000 10,000 –    30,000 Below 10,000
Table 7.  Thresholds for public procurement procedures 
 (levs, net of VAT)
28 Directive 92/50/EEC relating to the coordination of procedures for the award of public service 
contracts, Directive 92/50/EEC coordinating procedures for the award of public supply contracts, 
Directive 93/37/EEC concerning the coordination of procedures for the award of public works 
contracts and Directive 93/38/EEC coordinating the procurement procedures of entities operating 
in the water, energy, transport and telecommunications sector.
29 Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on 
the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts 
and public service contracts (often referred to as “the Public Sector Directive”) and Directive 
2004/17/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 coordinating the 
procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sector (often 
referred to as “the  Public Services Directive”).
These thresholds have never been an effective barrier to corruption because of 
the wide-spread practice of fragmentation of public procurement contracts into 
smaller portions in order to evade a competitive procedure (typically an open 
procedure, open competitive bidding or a public tender). The LPP defined such 
practice as circumvention of the law which distorted the selection procedure and 
the contract itself.
In addition to the thresholds, the legislation substantially changed with regard to 
the LPP scope of contracting authorities. The group of contracting authorities 
included not only the sectoral contracting authorities from the public utilities 
but also companies and non-profit organizations in which the government has 
a prevailing or dominant influence in the decision-making process. The law-
makers’ assumption was that in such cases managers in the public sector had the 
opportunity to transfer public funds to the private sector. Those were, for instance, 
the cases where the government, or perhaps a municipality, held shares in a 
company in a sufficient quantity to direct the decisions of the general meeting of 
the partners/shareholders on the distribution of dividends. The voluntary refusal 
of the principal to receive that source of income wholly or in part represents 
actually indirect disposal of budget resources. They were infused back into the 
company and therefore it had to fall within the scope of the LPP. That group 
included sole-owner companies, as well as all joint ventures with government 
or municipal interest, where the government or municipality had retained a 
blocking quota in the decision-making process. The legislative solution complied 
with the definition and interpretation of the concept “contracting authority” 
within the meaning of Art. 1, para 9 of Directive 2004/18/EEC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004.30 The definition covers also 
persons controlled or supervised by an organization (entity) governed by public 
law or having a collective governance body, more than half of whose members 
are appointed by an organization governed by public law.
Finally, for the last few years the set of tools at the disposal of public procurement 
contracting authorities has been considerably enriched with regard to the types 
of procedures. On the one hand, it has developed towards greater transparency 
with the introduction of e-tenders and commodity exchange trading. But on 
the other, the broadening of the range of tools tends to move towards more 
negotiations. The existing legal framework envisages such tools for the awarding 
of public procurement contracts and the acquisition of goods and services as 
the competitive dialogue, negotiations with or without announcement, dynamic 
supply systems and framework agreements. All of them imply a certain degree of 
restriction of the access of participants and greater discretionary powers of the 
contracting authority in the selection of the supplier/contractor which increases 
the risk of corruption. Does it mean that they have no place in the legal 
framework of public procurement?
As stated earlier, the economic efficiency of public procurement depends mostly 
on maximum transparency, equal treatment and competition among suppliers. But 
it depends also on the unlimited consumer choice of the contracting authority, 
 
 30  The Public Sector Directive
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alongside with these legislative principles. From the perspective of the public 
interest and fair competition, it is important not only for the contractors to have 
equal access to the public procurement market but also for the contracting 
authorities to have access to the market on equal footing with the other consumers 
from the private sector. The transaction costs incurred by both the public and 
the private sector should not be higher than the public benefits from the 
distribution of public procurement contracts on a competitive basis. These two 
relatively underestimated principles of economic efficiency guarantee that the 
public sector will not consume goods and services at prices which are higher than 
the market ones. The problem is that they do not always imply decisions that 
ensure maximum guarantees against corruption. This issue becomes increasingly 
relevant with the development of the knowledge-based economy, the need 
for choice among high-tech solutions associated with asymmetry of information 
between suppliers and consumers. It calls for new commercial practices where, 
together with transparency and competition (which play the leading role in non-
differentiated products), increasing importance is attached to partnership relations, 
trust and confidence, information and expertise, as well as the freedom of choice 
of the contracting authority in selecting its suppliers. In other words, with respect 
to many high-tech goods and services the use of negotiations - provided that 
there is no abuse of such procedures - serves the public interest much better 
than the conventional open procedure. In this context, the challenge for the 
anti-corruption policy is to strike the proper balance between the limitations of 
the procedures and their economic efficiency. In a nutshell, the solution is not to 
restrict negotiation procedures but to limit the opportunities for their discretionary 
application or for their use to personal benefit. Of course, this makes the tasks 
of control in this sphere ever more difficult as it requires increased relevance of 
expediency judgments alongside with legality considerations.31
Generally, Bulgaria has modern public procurement legislation which complies 
with the requirements of the EU Directives in its spirit and content. Naturally, its 
effective enforcement largely depends on the administrative and judicial capacity. 
A new phase of harmonization of the LPP is expected in the near future because 
of the upcoming changes in the European legislation concerning the administrative 
and judicial control in the process of awarding public procurement contracts.
4.2. E-TENDERS
E-tenders are a relatively new tool in the public procurement sphere. They are 
regulated in the two EU Directives of 2004 and they were incorporated into the 
Bulgarian national legislation with the latest amendments to the law in 2006.32 
However, their practical application is still very limited. The Ministry of Finance 
keeps the e-tender register for small-scale public procurement covering mainly 
the public tenders within the framework of the pre-accession funds. Modest as 






31 Directive 89/665/EEC on review procedures and Directive 92/12/EEC on sectoral contracting 
authorities 
32  See Pavlova, M., New Public Procurement Procedures Envisaged in the EU Legislation (in the Bulgarian 
language), Pazar i Pravo Journal, No. 5, 2006.
for attaining maximum competition and access to the market at minimum costs 
for the participants in the procedure. The scope of application is confined to 
goods with clear qualitative parameters, where the major criteria and the price 
and delivery time-table. Such supplies are possible not only in the case of small-
scale public procurement. E-bidding should become the rule in all possible cases, 
that is, when the quantitative and qualitative parameters of the supply are clearly 
defined. It is somewhat more difficult to apply this procedure to construction 
works and other services, although there are some examples to this effect. 
The share of e-tenders could be a good measure for the determination of the 
respective institution to restrict corruption in the public procurement sector.
4.3. LEGAL REMEDIES
The legal protection and control system, too, has undergone serious evolution. 
Administrative and judicial control under the general provisions of the Law on the 
Administrative Procedure was quite limited initially and subsequently the applicable 
provisions became those concerning the general procedure of filing claims. The 
main reason given was the inefficiency caused by the time limits for hearing 
court cases and the prospects for suspension of public procurement proceedings 
against the backdrop of the urgency and volume of the economic, legal and 
public interests interwoven in a public procurement procedure. Over the period 
from 2004 to 2006 it reached the paradoxical state of administrative acts issued 
in the public procurement process being challenged under a special procedure at 
the district courts. A lot of resources were spent at that time to train magistrates 
of first-instance courts who were not familiar with that matter. In 2006, the legal 
protection system was reshuffled once again and the first-instance control was 
entrusted to the Commission for the Protection of Competition (CPC). It is too 
early to say whether that measure is effective or not. One of the main problems 
it will encounter is the lack of human and material resources to cope with 
backlogs. A certain barrier to the malicious appeal is the financial guarantee to 
be paid by the contestant as a provisional security measure in the amount of 1% 
of the value of the transaction.
It is necessary to review some procedural rules concerning the liability of 
the central and local governments for damage inflicted on individual citizens. 
Regressive action against the official who has made the public institution liable 
will have to become mandatory in certain or most cases, depending on the 
nature of the liability.
A major problem in the redress arrangements is the use of the term “legal 
interest” when administrative acts are challenged before a court of law. Many 
acts of the highest body of the executive power cannot be contested by anybody 
because for this to take place the contestant has to prove that he has personal 
and immediate interest in the repeal. For example, the decisions concerning the 
largest investment projects that are supported or launched by the government 
cannot be challenged because they do not affect anybody personally according 
to the applicable interpretation of the term. The paradox lies in the fact that it 
is exactly decisions that affect everybody cannot be challenged by anybody. Thus 
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the prevailing interpretation of the term legal interest is a statutory brake on the 
challenging of decisions of special public importance.
Legal interest is an essential element of the active legitimization in the civil and 
administrative process. It boils down to the questions “Who can challenge the 
acts of the contracting authority?” and “Who can request the court to announce 
a public procurement contract, awarded without due procedure, null and void?” 
The concept of “any party concerned” (Art. 120, para 2 LPP) gives the formal 
answer to the former question. The court practices under the two consecutively 
repealed laws on administrative procedures (LAP) of 1971 and 1979 have left the 
concept that the interest of a person is legitimate if it is: (i) legal; (ii) personal); 
and (iii) direct (immediate). This has been the court practice since 1976;33 there 
is also a judgment to this effect ruled by the Constitutional Court.34 At present, 
Art. 147 of the Code of Administrative Procedure (CAP) recognizes the interest in 
attacking an individual administrative act to a person whose rights, liberties or 
legitimate interests are infringed or threatened by the act or a person for whom 
obligations arise out of the act. However, the formal definition is limited by the 
third element of the wording cited above, i.e. whether the interest is immediate 
or not. In the context of the LPP, potential direct infringement of interests would 
exist only with regard to the entities which are (pursuant to Art. 6) the contracting 
authority, the bidders, the participants and the contractor. The relevant definitions 
in the LPP (see § 1 of the Additional Provisions) leave no opportunity for broader 
interpretation. Similar is the treatment of this issue in the two existing EC 
Directives on the legal protection in public procurement.35 Directive 89/665/EEC 
recognizes the legitimate interest of persons who have or had interest in winning 
and being awarded a public procurement contract; this principle is further 
developed by the European Court of Justice also with regard to the persons who 
are affected or could be affected by infringements in the awarding of public 
procurement contracts.36 This generally exhausts all opportunities for civil society 
to intervene in the way in which public funds are spent.
The practice in Bulgaria knows no exceptions, apart from the area of environmental 
protection. Pursuant to Art. 9 of the Aarhus Convention37 environmental non-
governmental organizations have the explicitly recognized right to challenge acts 
of public authorities which could affect the environment. However, there is no 















33 At that time, Ruling No. 4/76 of the Plenum of the Supreme Court was adopted with the 
objective to summarize and bring uniformity in the practices under the Law on Administrative 
Procedures of 1971. It largely became the point of departure for the doctrine of the administrative 
process for decades on end, including the subsequent interpretative judgments related also to 
the understanding of legal interest in challenging administrative acts.
34 See Judgment No. 21 of 1995 of the Constitutional Court on the objective element in the 
infringement of personal interests.
35 Directive 89/665/EEC on review procedures and Directive 92/12/EEC on sectoral contracting 
authorities
36 Hackermuller ECJ 19/6/2003 C-249/01; also Fritsch, Chiari & Partners C-410/01.
37 Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in 
Environmental Matters (Aarhus Convention), ratified by a law adopted by the 39th National Assembly 
on 2 October 2003; promulgated in The State Gazette, No. 91 of 14 October 2003. The text of 
the Convention was published by the Ministry of the Environment and Waters, The State Gazette, 
No. 33 of 23 April 2004 and entered into force on 16 March 2004.
A kind of breakthrough can be seen only in the practice of the European Court 
of Justice which assumes that third parties can be legitimized to challenge public 
procurement procedures, where discriminatory terms of reference have disallowed 
them from participation.38 EU Member States are not strictly bound by this ruling. 
Conversely, they can envisage easier access to justice of a broader range of 
persons. Whether and how this can be done is a matter of national legislation.
The issue at stake in Bulgaria is how the review of the legal interest concept can 
expand the opportunities for effective public control over the awarding of public 
procurement contracts. A tangible step forward are the general provisions on 
legal interest in attacking administrative acts under the new Code of Administrative 
Procedure (more specifically, Art. 147, para 1 and Art. 186, para 1). It is for the first 
time that the Bulgarian law-makers explicitly recognize the right of citizens and 
organizations whose rights, liberties or legitimate interests are affected or could be 
affected to challenge individual and statutory administrative acts. This approach 
sets the beginning of the long awaited constitutionalization of the administrative 
process perceived as a shift primarily to the protection of the constitutional rights 
and freedoms of individual citizens and their organizations.39
The next possible step is the introduction of class action which could render 
meaningful the provisions of Art. 120a of the LPP. Otherwise, they would seem 
only palliative because the prevailing understanding of legal interest in challenging 
acts before the court of law is still strongly restrictive. Class action would 
lead to significant procedural economy because court judgments would become 
enforceable with regard to all affected consumers who suffered from the same 
action or inaction of the defendant, although only one or a few brought the case 
to the court. But this would call for substantial amendments to the Code of Civil 
Procedure (CCP). The time for the introduction of class action is quite appropriate 
because of the upcoming debate on the draft of a new CCP. 
4.4. CONTROL
The institutional ex-post control is entrusted to three agencies. The Public 
Procurement Agency at the Ministry of the Economy and Energy is responsible 
for the overall coordination and conduct of tender procedures and maintains 
the Public Procurement Register (PPR). The National Audit Office performs the 
external audit functions, i.e. it exercises supervision mandated by the legislative 
power with regard to the lawfulness of public procurement procedures. However, 
it has no powers to impose sanctions when irregularities are detected; it can only 
advise the Parliament and the Ministry of Finance. The internal audit is carried 
out by the Public Financial Inspection Agency (PFIA which was the Public Internal 
Financial Control Agency or PIFCA until 2006). It has more powers to check not 







38 Grossmann Air Services, ECJ 12/2/2004, C-230/02.
39 The lack of constitutional justice at the appeal of the party concerned casts a shadow on both 
the direct effect of the Constitution and the opportunity for protection of the constitutional rights 
and freedoms of citizens. In the latter case, the only remedy is the administrative process in the 
court of law.
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public procurement procedures. The process of absorption of budget resources 
and EU funds will be monitored and audited also by internal auditors at the 
contracting authorities in pursuance of the Law on the Internal Audit in the Public 
Sector and the Law on the Financial Management and Control in the Public Sector which 
were adopted in the beginning of 2006. The effectiveness of this control is 
based on adding expediency considerations to its scope. Increasing importance 
is attached to the ex-ante review and risk management, the establishment and 
monitoring of the compliance with rules of ethics, the development of written 
policies and the introduction of a monitoring system. Still, the effectiveness of 
internal audit should be also subject to monitoring and public accountability. 
In this sense, it is necessary to use a modern risk assessment system and to 
broaden the scope of audits in big transactions, i.e. in value terms the internal 
audit should cover some 60% of the contracts awarded at the implementation 
stage. Currently, it does cover 60% of the contracts but they account for only 
one-third in value terms.
Whatever the forms of legal and administrative protection and control, they 
cannot sufficiently compensate for the public and individual losses incurred in a 
poorly conducted procedure. The forms of retroactive control could be effective 
only if they create conditions for serious prevention of future infringements. In 
this sense, the CPC is faced with great challenges but it hardly has more capacity 
to meet them than district courts have on a short-term basis. Urgent measures 
are needed to strengthen the CPC capacity to handle appeals. Special attention 
should be paid to the so called secondary guarantees of legality, such as the 
collateral to be paid by the appellant, the suspension of the procedure only at 
a decision of the CPC, the internal audit work in the public administration and 
the monitoring systems and the compliance with the rules of ethics by public 
procurement officers.
4.5. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONTRACTS
At present, the legal framework with regard to public procurement covers only 
the awarding procedures, i.e. the whole process up to the signing of the 
contracts. The only subsequent guarantee against abuses is the ban on changing 
the contracts once they have been signed. The purpose of this provision is to 
curb the practices which were quite common until recently, i.e. to sign annexes 
to the contracts so that to change the parameters which were indicated to win 
the contract.
However, the LPP contains no guarantees and control mechanisms against abuse 
in the implementation phase. The risk of deviation from the contract with the 
tacit consent of the contracting authority is significant in the case of construction 
works which account for a half of the value of all contracts and also in services. 
Such corrupt practices remain beyond the remit of financial control or sanctions. A 
partial barrier to compromises with quality in the implementation phase could be 
a more detailed regulation on the performance collateral required in construction 
works and services. It would be even better to optimize the investor’s control 
functions in the implementation of public procurement contracts, especially in 
construction works. This, too, might prove quite difficult since the investor’s 
control is not immune against corruption either.
4.6. MONITORING
Transparency and the monitoring of the public procurement process are among the 
most important elements of the protection against corruption in this sphere. The 
main tool to this effect is the Public Procurement Register. Its establishment was 
undoubtedly a step forward in enhancing the transparency of tender procedures 
and reducing the corruption pressure. Nevertheless, its use still falls short of 
optimal levels because not all procedures are registered there yet. Besides, it 
remains a good source of information about a specific procedure (provided that 
the contracting authority has registered it) but it is not suitable for monitoring of 
the process and identification of risk areas and sectors by means of aggregated 
data. The register should provide not only information about individual tenders 
but also statistical indicators to assess the level of corruption and corruption risks 
by awarding sectors and industries (suppliers). An example of such an indicator is 
the type of procedure. Until 2004 it was possible to use it in order to gauge the 
percentage of non-tender procedures (direct negotiations, direct awarding, etc.) 
of the total number of contracts. It would be even better to have the statistics 
based on the value rather than the number of contracts. But no such breakdowns 
have been made since the register was transferred to the PPA. The register 
should make it possible to identify sectors and contracting authorities with high 
vulnerability on the basis of several indicators of the corruption risk.
In this context, the confidentiality of the information related to public procurement 
procedures becomes particularly relevant. Public procurement contracts with 
their numerous appendices cannot be kept secret from the public on behalf 
and in the interest of which they have been awarded. Pursuant to Art. 31, 
para 1 and Art. 33, para 4 of the LPP both the contracting authority and the 
participant have the right to specify which portion of their documentation is 
of confidential nature and is not subject to disclosure. In practice, however, 
there is a tendency to restrict the access to the information and documentation 
related to public procurement as much as possible. This should not be allowed 
with regard to information that is not protected by law (the latter include 
personal data, classified information and know-how). 
4.7. EFFECTIVE SANCTIONS AGAINST ABUSE
Criminal prosecution of corruption has limited applicability in public procurement. 
The reasons lie in the very essence of criminal law which focuses on behavior 
that is entirely or primarily dependent on the capability of conscious judgment 
and the right of choice of the individual. They, in turn, affect the evidence 
required in criminal proceedings and therefore the most frequent result from the 
prosecution of infringements in the public procurement sector is close to zero. 
Furthermore, the Bulgarian Criminal Code does not contain any special provisions 
to criminalize unlawful behavior in public procurement. It is prosecuted under 
the general terms and conditions of what is defined as breach of trust under the 
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well-known Art. 282 CC. No such special provisions would have been necessary 
if Art. 282 had been effective. But this is not the case and it is sufficient to recall 
the origin and spread of such an approach in the legislation of other countries.
Law enforcement and economic policies operate on the basis of sets of rules 
and concepts which have little in common. This is particularly dangerous when 
some general financial and business concepts are used because their meaning 
has undergone substantial changes. In spite of its numerous amendments since 
1989, the Criminal Code is based on obsolete terminology which would be more 
appropriate for the centrally planned economy. The market economy is associated 
with many more risks and calls for much greater flexibility. The expectations for 
profit are not backed by any guarantees. On the other hand, it is very difficult and 
almost impossible to decide when the loss is deliberately caused and when other 
reasons prevail. The Criminal Code is premised on the theory of universal causality. 
The issue concerning the relationship between the doctrinal understanding of guilt 
in the Criminal Code and the concepts of modern psychology is similar.
In this context, it is interesting to trace out the links of the public procurement 
market to gray economy. Such a linkage seems highly improbable at first glance. 
Public procurement implies the spending of public funds which are typically budget 
resources. Transactions are associated with greater transparency and accountability, 
reducing the opportunities for tax evasion and accounting fraud. On the other 
hand, however, it is precisely for these reasons that the revenues of public 
procurement contractors enjoy a positive public image to the utmost degree. It is 
hard to imagine a more legitimate source of revenue than from the state budget. 
Therefore public procurement is quite attractive for money-laundering purposes. 
This becomes most apparent when the winner has submitted an inexplicably 
low-priced bid that is obviously below cost. Such cases are not rare, especially 
in construction works and engineering. It is no secret that the shadow business 
tries to find legitimization through “regular” business that is, in a sense, the tip 
of the iceberg. The new wording of Art. 70 LPP can be assessed positively from 
this perspective. It envisages the obligation of the public procurement body to 
require detailed written justification of the price bid which is more than 30% 
lower than the average price of the other bids. If the committee is not convinced 
that the arguments stated in the justification are warranted, it may propose to the 
contracting authority to remove the respective participant from the procedure.
Such a risk, although in the reverse direction, exists in high-value consulting 
services because, as a rule, it is very difficult to justify or assess costs there. 
A bid may be unjustifiably high but it might well be the winner if there are 
no other competitive bids. This would happen when possible competitors are 
discouraged to take part in the procedure or when the terms of reference and 
the technical specifications are worded exclusively to the benefit of a certain 
bidder/participant. 
Making criminal prosecution even stricter would hardly produce a tangible effect. 
More stringent penalties could not be productive at low detection rates and with 
a small number of persons convicted. The crime detection rates and the number 
of pre-trial proceedings ending up with indictments in court determine the level 
of public perceptions as to the inevitability of punishment. Even more important 
to this effect is the number of court cases ending up with convictions. These 
perceptions have a greater deterrence effect than penalties. This is evidenced by 
the data published in the 2004 and 2005 Corruption Assessment Reports of the Center 
for the Study of Democracy. Over the period from 1999 to 2005, the number 
of court cases ended with convictions under Arts. 282-283a CC ranged from 30 
to 45 and that of the persons convicted was 30 to 50 per annum, although 
the legal provisions had been amended to make the liability more serious. A 
similar conclusion can be drawn from the number of pre-trial proceedings and 
the number of those proceedings which ended with an opinion on the need for 
a trial over the same period. In fact, since 1993 the number of cases brought 
to court, the number of indictments and the number of persons convicted 
have fluctuated only insignificantly for reasons other than the amendments to 
the substantive law or to the Code of Criminal Procedure.40 Therefore the penal 
policy can become more effective in Bulgaria only if it is integrated into the 
other policies pursued by government institutions. Effectiveness can be enhanced 
through the implementation of simultaneous measures along several lines.
Insofar as the adoption of an entirely new Criminal Code is a matter of generally 
recognized need, it could provide the opportunity to introduce effective provisions 
criminalizing specific actions in public procurement on the basis of the typical 
cases of infringements. The reverse argument challenges the justification of the 
specialization because the general and the special provisions could not be 
distinguished from one another. An argument to this effect is the criminal 
liability for breach of trust in the privatization and the disposal of state-owned 
or municipal property (Art. 283a) introduced in 1997. The trade-off between the 
two theses lies in the understanding that, generally, it is time to go beyond the 
prevailing hypotheses of resultant breach of trust in the economy as they prove 
to be futile. It would be more prospective to criminalize the conspiracy against 
the market as is the case in many developed market economies. The practice 
of enforcing the existing provisions of Art. 220 and Arts. 282-285 CC41 is most 
unsatisfactory. It has turned out that in a market economy these offences cannot 
be proved for all practical purposes and they cannot be sued in court. Bribery 
is even more difficult to prosecute, especially when graft is indirect (through one 
or more intermediaries) or within the framework of an existing organized group 
which holds the requisite infrastructure (network of companies in Bulgaria and 
abroad, bank accounts, money-laundering schemes and other forms of disguise). 
Thus the possible criminal abuse in public procurement remains unpunished 
and, in turn, reduces the power of prevention. The only possible outcome is to 
criminalize conspiracy in the economy and to prosecute money laundering more 
persistently.
Administrative liability is also within the scope of sanctions. Naturally, many 
infringements in public procurement procedures do not warrant criminal 







40 Anti-Corruption Reforms in Bulgaria, Center for the Study of Democracy, Sofia, 2005, pp. 39-40; 
On the Eve of EU Accession: Anti-corruption Reforms in Bulgaria,, Center for the Study of Democracy, 
Sofia, 2006, p. 66.
41 Non-beneficial transaction and breach of trust respectively.
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an offence or because of inability to gather admissible evidence or because the 
infringement does not fall within the purview of the Criminal Code. Nevertheless, 
the administrative criminal liability should not be underestimated. The new 
provisions of the LPP (Arts. 127-133) envisage many new cases of liability aimed 
directly at the contracting authority and its staff. When the public procurement 
contract is of high value and conditions exist to presume a corrupt transaction, 
the administrative liability of the procurement officer as a natural person is a 
relatively weak barrier. The amount of the fine envisaged for such cases is of little 
relevance. At the same time, the provisions concerning the actions or inactions of 
other officials involved in public procurement procedures would be much more 
effective, including from the perspective of prevention. From the viewpoint of 
the individual motivation of officers, it is very unlikely for them to be prepared 
to take risks related to the behavior of their superior. An exception to this rule 
would be the case of their complicity in the respective offence. Therefore one 
should welcome the introduction of the new provisions of Arts. 127a-129b LPP 
and, more specifically: 
 
• the actions of officials authorized by the contracting authority to organize 
and conduct public procurement awarding procedures and to sign the 
contracts;
• the disclosure of information on the public procurement awarding procedure 
by a member of the evaluation committee.
Even more important is the fact that the statements on the violations detected 
are drawn up by officials of the Public Financial Inspection Agency. Their findings 
could provide legitimate grounds to start pre-trial proceedings; moreover, they 
could contain sufficient indications that an offence has been committed. The 
actual prerequisites for this possibility are the professional qualifications of the 
officials and their obligation under the Law on the Administrative Violations and 
Penalties to collect evidence of the infringement as a precondition for drawing up 
the statement.
One of the weaknesses of the administrative liability under the LPP is its focus 
exclusively on the contracting authority, as defined under Art. 7. The problem 
lies in the definition itself rather than the cases in which this liability can be 
invoked. Liability is always personal, whereas Art. 7 refers to both organizations 
as contracting authorities (administrations within the scope of the Law on the 
Administration and legal entities under the Commercial Code) and natural persons 
as heads of administrative structures (bodies) without making any distinction 
between them. Moreover, the term “organization governed by public law” within 
the meaning of § 1, subpara 21 of the LPP could exclude (and does exclude in 
the strictest interpretation of the term) municipalities and their mayors. Since the 
provisions envisaging sanctions cannot be construed restrictively, the liability of 
mayors and local governments is put to doubt, especially if the penalty orders are 
attacked in court under the Law on the Administrative Violations and Penalties.
4.8. STRENGTHENING OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITY
The adjustment of practices to the legal framework is always a lengthy process. 
Due to the dynamic nature of legislation from 1999 to 2006, contracting authorities 
did not always have the opportunity to adapt their operations to the legislative 
novelties. But the gaining of experience in public procurement enables them 
to shorten the lead period. The most important accomplishment is the already 
existing organizational culture of using public procurement as a policy tool in 
the various sectors and, conversely, making public procurement itself the subject 
of policy.
Most administrations and other contracting authorities have used the time since 
the adoption of the LPP for their own institutional development and strengthening 
of the administrative capacity in the public procurement sphere. The establishment 
of specialized public procurement management structures has started either as 
independent units or as bodies performing other administrative functions as well. 
This has produced positive impact on their public procurement expertise.  
The enforcement of the LPP and RSPP in their current wording narrows the 
loopholes for their circumvention. Parallel to the increased public intolerance 
to corruption, this reduces the opportunities for practicing the familiar forms 
of corruption and the introduction of new ones. The reinforcement of this 
tendency calls for development of public procurement policies along several lines: 
introduction of rules for ethical conduct in public procurement; development of 
policies and corporate public procurement plans in each administration which 
operates as a contracting authority; and strengthening of the administrative 
capacity to implement international projects with partial or predominant external 
financing with a view to gaining access to the EU funds.   
The introduction of codes of conduct for public procurement officers is not 
widely discussed. The EU legislation guarantees transparency and equal treatment 
of the participants in public procurement procedures but everyday practices tend 
to deviate from these principles by giving preferences to domestic participants or 
circumvention of the applicable law. It is the rules of ethics that need to offset 
these negative tendencies and to promote compliance with the European and 
national legislation in the public procurement sphere. Codes of conduct should 
fill in the loopholes in the legal framework, guide to proper understanding 
and interpretation of legal provisions, and foster greater efficiency of public 
procurement.
The introduction of codes of conduct for civil servants and all other public 
procurement officers is a recognized need. Compliance would greatly reduce 
infringements and create preconditions for intolerance to them within administrations 
and corporations. Such model rules have already been drafted and what remains 
for government authorities is to adopt them for their respective administrations 
and make arrangements for their application. The rules could serve as a quality 
criterion in administrative work. Their use for the purposes of the certification 
systems in the administration could turn into a powerful incentive not only for 
their formal adoption but also for their application in day-to-day work. 
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The systematic human resources training should run for magistrates and controlling 
bodies at the same time, as well as for the personnel of the public and corporate 
administration on issues of common interest. An example of such issues could be 
public procurement, particularly with regard to the standards set out in the EU 
Directives and the case law of the European Court of Justice in Luxembourg.
Equally important for the strengthening of the administrative capacity is to 
gradually move the administrations of contracting authorities away from political 
influences through the recruitments systems and to enhance the independence 
of their middle management level. This is relevant also to the appointment of 
public procurement committees and to their rules of procedure as their members 
should be as independent from the political offices as much as possible. Parallel 
to it, positions for compliance monitoring officers could be opened so that they 
could supervise the observance of legal and ethical standards in close interaction 
with civil society institutions and media. Such positions could be opened at the 
inspectorate departments of the respective conventional contracting authorities 
and the regulators in the utilities sector.
4.9. REGULATION OF THE FINANCING OF POLITICAL PARTIES, LOBBYING 
AND PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS
As well as the internal factors and prerequisites within the public procurement 
system, the reduction of the incentives and preconditions for political corruption, 
which generates corruption also in public procurement, should be the focus of 
the anti-corruption policy. Otherwise the optimization of the legal framework 
of public procurement with all its components would not produce the desired 
results. The main highlights are the financing of political parties, the regulation of 
political lobbies and public-private partnerships.
The financing of political parties remains high on the agenda. There are strong 
public expectations of a solution while at the same time there is no tangible 
progress. By definition, each political party is an organization for systematic 
exercise of public influence. When coupled with higher level of organization 
and discipline it becomes potentially dangerous if the party falls prey to corrupt 
motivation and standards of conduct. In fact, the problem becomes public when 
the party leadership is fully or partially in the hands of people whose value 
systems and life priorities deviate from the generally accepted goals and principles 
of political life. These are cases in which the individual behavior is most easily 
transformed into the dominant organizational conduct. For these reasons, political 
favoritism of certain businesses is already a highly reliable indicator of corruption. 
The transparency of financing is a still unresolved problem. Unlike public benefit 
NGOs, political parties do not submit financial reports that are sufficiently open 
to the general public. Indeed, their reports are submitted to the National Audit 
Office which audits them and publishes them in its bulletin and on its web site 
(Art. 34, para 5 LPP). However, the truthfulness and completeness of the financial 
documentation made available are not checked. It is only formally irregular files 
that go to the National Revenue Agency. It is impossible for the time being to 
counter-check the sources of financing if the political party has formally fulfilled 
its obligation to draw up seemingly impeccable financial reports. But this does 
not particularly enhance the public confidence in the way in which political life 
is financed in Bulgaria.
On the other hand, it is necessary to analyze whether the domestic legislation 
concerning political parties is adequate and realistic. The financial constraints are 
so formidable that there is hardly any political party capable of unconditional 
compliance. The ineligible financial sources are enumerated in Art. 24 of the 
LPP, including anonymous donations, whereas the preceding provisions allow 
fund-raising activities. These two concepts are defined in § 1, subparas 1 and 3 
of the law.42 The definition makes it clear that any collection of money could 
be considered a fund-raising activity, including the collection against promises to 
achieve certain political and economic results. No distinction is made between the 
cases when an individual requests funds and the specific activities targeted to an 
indefinite or broadly defined audience at which the party, or its representatives, 
put forward their platform and solicit financial or material support but in an 
unconditional manner.
It is widely known that the amount of the state subsidy (for parties represented in 
parliament) and membership dues is insufficient to ensure normal party operation 
and running in elections. Election campaign costs have increased drastically in the 
last ten years and this is a trend not only in Bulgaria but also in all democratic 
countries. The growing influence of the media and the media presence of 
political parties inevitably sustain this trend. Political activities become ever 
more technological and professional, while the voluntary participation and the 
personal financial input lose grounds. A large portion of the party expenditures 
will remain hidden from society. The typical examples to this effect are the 
expenditures a media presence, promotional materials (especially in election 
campaigns), rents and support of halls and clubs, concerts and other promotional 
events, transportation and accommodation costs. A national party event, for 
instance, implies the traveling of several hundred to several thousand people, 
something that is hardly affordable even to the biggest representatives of the 
corporate world, not to speak of the massive or group transportation of voters 
or the organized “vote shopping” among certain groups of the electorate which 
have been repeatedly covered by the media. 
It is also well-known that much of the financing of political parties is provided by 
ancillary organizations, sometimes in cash and often in kind, insofar as media and 
other costs could be presented as corporate expenditure (promotion, advertisement, 
encouragement of sales, business development, etc.). The advancement of 
privatization and the obscure relations between the corporate environment and 
politics, which are still in the making, limit the possible sources of financing. 
This drastically enhances the importance of public procurement as a source and 
provides the logical explanation of the parameters of political corruption in the 
awarding of public procurement contracts. It is not sufficient to have the legal 






42 1. ‘Anonymous donations’ are donations in which the identity or name of the donor are not 
disclosed to third parties; ... 3. ‘Find-raising activities’ are collecting activities on the basis of 
a transaction for consideration or free of charge in the form of money, services or technical 
equipment to the benefit of a specific political party”.
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in public procurement procedures, where the latter have not been completed and 
the time limit for appeal under the Law on Public Procurement has not expired, 
or resources of a public procurement contractor or a legal entity in the process 
of privatization. Against this backdrop, the reduction of the corruption pressure 
on the awarding of public procurement contracts calls for legalization of some 
existing sources of party financing and elimination of some legislative constraints. 
This is particularly relevant to the donation arrangements, where the ceilings are 
too low and certainly inadequate to the needs of a political party. Besides, it is 
important to take into account the diversity of financing forms, including indirect 
financing, such as the various forms of contribution in kind by third parties (mainly 
legal entities) – transportation services, halls, offices, printing, access to electronic 
media, outdoor advertising, etc. If they are explicitly regulated and treated as 
eligible donations, the effect would be positive provided that analogous and 
adequate tax arrangements are introduced. Thus it would become easier to trace 
out the donations with a view to the other legal constraints, e.g. the ban on the 
financing by foreign governments and foreign legal entities. Such measures would 
not be successful without the gradual but consistent minimization of payments in 
cash which is within the remit of the central bank and the government.
The regulation of lobbying is an anti-corruption measure which is quite non-
conventional in Europe. It is exactly in the anti-corruption vein that the legislative 
initiatives of the 40th National Assembly to this effect are advertised. Generally 
speaking, lobbying is not typical of the continental type of parliamentarianism and 
this is the reason for the lack of such regulation in Europe (except for Poland since 
quite recently). Although the attempt at introducing such regulation in Bulgaria 
should be commended in principle, tangible results from its possible introduction 
could hardly be expected. One of the reasons is that the regulation of lobbying 
is called to life mainly by the requirements to declare and avoid conflicts of 
interest. This is a much broader concept than corruption and, in practice, it has 
little to do with corruption. The bill explicitly bans lobbying under the Law on 
Public Procurement and the Law on Concessions. This is to be welcomed because 
no lobbying should be allowed in strictly formalized procedures in principle. It 
is still unclear why the privatization process, for instance, is not included in its 
scope. It is more important, however, that lobbyists can easily circumvent the 
law by pressurizing through party staff or mimicking as consultants in the public 
sector. Therefore one encounters the everyday perception that lobbying comes 
to put order in corrupt practices instead of eliminating them. On the other 
hand, lobbying does not seem to be a lucrative prospect as long as the levels of 
political corruption are high. The gray sector of the economy would always opt 
for direct financing of party coffers and private accounts rather than for payment 
to expensive lobbyists without any guarantees for the final outcome.
Public-private partnerships. The concept of public-private partnerships is defined 
and used in many different ways. It covers various manifestations of partnership, 
e.g. joint ventures, joint projects, commissioning of the building and operation of 
a finished product for a certain period of time (B.O.T. arrangements or similar 
schemes), concessions, various forms of outsourcing, etc. However, the public 
opinion is particularly sensitive to the involvement of the central and/or local 
government in joint organizational forms of business. The public sector almost 
invariably participates with real estate. The doubts about inefficiency go hand 
in hand with the doubts about corruption and they are most frequently caused 
by the non-transparent choice of a partner and negotiation of the terms and 
conditions. The existing problems can be out into three main groups:
• lack of rules/grounds for the “when, why, with whom and how” modalities 
to launch partnerships;
• lack of defined and announced policies for involvement in the various 
forms of public-private partnership;
• lack of competitive and transparent procedures for the choice of a partner 
similar to the procedures under the LPP, which constrains competition and 
hence efficiency.
Generally, public-private partnerships lead to avoidance of the need for application 
of the Law on Public Procurement once they are established. The exception to 
this rule is the regime of concessions which are subject to an exhaustive list 
of rules harmonized with the EU requirements and, basically, identical to those 
under the LPP. In all other cases, however, PPPs are established on the basis 
of the general terms and procedures, i.e. pursuant to the Commercial Code, 
neglecting the specific features of public institutions as the principals of business. 
Their covert goal could be the provision of unilateral competitive advantages 
which contradicts the logic of public procurement. No cases of public-private 
partnerships challenges on such grounds have become known so far and they 
can hardly be expected in the near future. Against the background of these 
problems, it is urgent to improve the legislation. First and foremost, rules need to 
be established for these partnerships and especially for the joint ventures between 
the central (or local) government and other companies with non-predominant 
state/municipal stake. The rules should be imperative for public institutions and 
the legal entities hey control directly or indirectly, regardless of whether they are 
business undertakings, associations or foundations. In principle, the range of the 
entities involved would be identical to that under Art. 7 and § 1 of the Additional 
Provisions of the Law on Public Procurement: “organizations governed by public 
law”, “public enterprises”, “related undertakings”, etc. The rules should envisage 
competitive procedures for the selection of a partner, which are identical or 
similar to those under the LPP and the Law on Concessions.
The issue at stake is somewhat different in the case of the implementation of 
public-private partnerships. The Law on Public Procurement contains a number 
of provisions concerning PPP in order to ensure its application to the newly 
established partnerships. In the first place, these are the provisions of Art. 14, 
paragraphs 4 and 5 LPP concerning contracts for construction works or services 
related to construction contracts which are financed predominantly (over 50 
percent) from the budget of public procurement contracting authorities governed 
by public law. In these cases, construction works are commissioned by a private 
person but the predominant budget co-financing automatically emancipated this 
person as the recipient of the financing to the level of a public procurement 
contracting authority within the scope of the LPP. Secondly, any legal entity 
which is the partner of a legal entity of a public procurement contracting 
authority (or which is established through such partnership) can be construed as 
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an organization governed by public law within the scope of § 1, subpara 21 of 
the LPP (i.e. a public procurement contracting authority) in any of the following 
four alternative cases:
• if during the previous year it had been financed mainly from a budget 
source or an equivalent source;
• if more than a half of the members of its managing or supervisory body 
are appointed by contracting authorities which are government bodies or 
organizations governed by public law;
• if the legal entity is subject to managerial control by contracting authorities 
which are government bodies or organizations governed by public law, i.e. 
they can exercise dominant influence on the activities of the legal entity;
• if the legal entity is a healthcare establishment – a company of which at 
least 30 percent of the revenues in the previous year came from the budget 
or the National Health Insurance Fund.
The application of these provisions depends also on the sector in which the 
legal entity operates. The conditions enumerated above are applicable only if 
it has been established to meet public interests (this objective is presumed for 
healthcare establishments). In this sense, it will not be each and every public-
private partnership that would fall within the scope of the definition of an 
organization governed by public law as a type of public procurement contracting 
authority. 
There is considerable corruption risk not only in the non-transparent and 
unclear way of establishing public-private partnerships but also in the rather easy 
arrangements under the LPP which enable them to channel budget resources 
to suppliers of goods and services, while circumventing the public procurement 
regime. For example, the obligation to apply this law to the consumption of 
goods and services by these entities refers only to those in which the government 
holds over 50% of the PPP. It is enough for the government to be involved 
with 50% in order to award contracts without applying the respective public 
procurement procedures, regardless of the value of the contract. To put it in brief, 
if those in government wish to channel substantial public resources to a supplier 
or a contractor who is close to them, without applying the LPP, it is sufficient for 
them to establish a PPP with a third close company with not more than 50% 
state participation. 
It is recommendable in the future to apply competitive procedures to the 
establishment of the major types of public-private partnerships. For this purpose, 
it would be necessary to amend at least the Law on the Administration and the Law 
on Local Government and the Local Administration, so that to make reference to the 
LPP and require its application in such cases. As regards substantive law, these 
amendments could envisage grounds for the entry of a given administration into 
PPP of commercial or entirely public nature.
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CONCLUSION
This study justified the urgent need for optimization of the economic and legal 
policies to restrict and counteract corruption in public procurement and their 
integration into a complete and effective system. Its point of departure is the legal 
framework of public procurement and its statutory and institutional prerequisites 
for the occurrence of the most common corrupt practices. From the perspective 
of anti-corruption efforts, the following are the four major elements of this legal 
framework:
а) the types of public procurement procedures;
b) their scope from the point of view of contracting authorities and 
thresholds;
c) the legal remedies;
d) the system of control and sanctions.
In accordance with the acquis communautaire, the existing Law on Public Procurement 
defines three main principles underlying the legal framework of public procurement: 
openness and transparency; free and fair competition and equal treatment; non-
discrimination. They shape the overall frame for assessing the effectiveness of the 
public procurement regime. The issue is whether the existing regime provides 
maximum transparency, competition and equal treatment of public procurement 
suppliers and contractors. These are the benchmarks for the assessment of the 
corruption risk and for the identification of the most vulnerable aspects of the 
legal framework of public procurement.
Many experts in Bulgaria believe that there is nothing more to be desired from 
the legal framework of public procurement since it has been almost completely 
harmonized with the acquis communautaire. Firstly, such a conclusion should be 
accepted with some reservations. There still exist essential discrepancies, especially 
with regard to the regime of concessions and some procedures. But even if this 
were true, it would mean that the commitments to the European Commission 
have been fulfilled but not necessarily those to the Bulgarian society, particularly 
with regard to the reduction and prevention of corruption. The harmonization 
with the EU legislation is primarily intended to guarantee the free movement 
of goods, people, services and capital within the single market. However, these 
freedoms imply and require a corruption-free business environment. Therefore the 
transposition of the acquis communautaire into the national legislation provides the 
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groundwork on which to build and it is particularly relevant when it introduces 
higher standards than those envisaged in the domestic legislation.
Secondly, the harmonization of the public procurement legislation is not a one-
off act; it is a dynamic process of reflecting the continuously changing market 
challenges in the national legislations. Therefore it is never the ultimate goal but 
it is rather a tool in the process. From the perspective of the accountability 
of the legislature to society for the establishment of regulatory and institutional 
barriers to corruption, the relevant question is not whether the legislation is fully 
harmonized with the acquis but whether it meets the objectives for which it has 
been developed, i.e. whether it meets the specific social needs and copes with 
the corruption risks in the country.
There are still many urgent questions related to the optimization of the legal 
framework of public procurement from the perspective of the anti-corruption 
agenda of the Bulgarian society and their answers will not come from abroad. 
These are the issues of the thresholds above which the law operates; the 
guarantees against corruption at the sectoral contracting authorities; the 
negotiation arrangements and their share of the Bulgarian public procurement 
market; the powers and responsibilities of controlling bodies; the effectiveness of 
administrative and penal sanctions; the involvement of business associations in 
public procurement procedures.
The starting point for the identification of a practical solution to these issues 
can be found in the three principles which have already been mentioned: 
transparency, competition and equal treatment. But they are hardly sufficient 
on their own. Equally important are two other principles related to economic 
efficiency which tend to be underestimated for the time being. Firstly, the 
awarding and implementation of public procurement contracts should be carried 
out at minimum costs for the public and private sector. Secondly, the legal 
framework should guarantee not only equal treatment of suppliers and contractors 
but also equal treatment of the contracting authorities in comparison to the 
other market participants. Both principles are important from the perspective of 
economic efficiency and the protection of the public interest. They guarantee 
that the public sector will not consume goods and services at prices higher than 
those in the private sector, i.e. they are necessary preconditions for maximizing 
public benefit through the supply of public goods at prices close to the market 
levels. The problem is that the last two principles do not always and everywhere 
imply solutions of the same type that is required by the first three principles. 
The challenge for the reform in this area is to strike a proper balance between 
the principles of transparency and equal treatment, on the one hand, and the 
principles of economic efficiency, on the other.
Economic efficiency is related mainly to competition but it also often implies 
greater freedom of consumer choice than even the most up-to-date, perfect 
legal framework. This conclusion becomes increasingly relevant with globalization, 
the development of the knowledge-based economy, e-society, new technologies 
and commercial practices. The changes for the last two decades have enhanced 
the role of partnership relations, trust and confidence, expertise, and the choice 
of suppliers/contractors. In other words, all other conditions being equal, the 
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conventional approach to the selection of the supplier of many goods and services 
is not the most efficient solution from the perspective of the public interest. 
An example to this effect is the advantage that EC Directives give to suppliers 
and contractors from the European Union which is hardly aimed at maximum 
economic benefit, i.e. to ensure that the public sector is on equal footing with 
the private sector in the selection of suppliers of goods and services.
The ambition to optimize the public procurement system to make sure that it 
does not lag behind the development of the market has brought about a lot 
of remodeling of the harmonized European legislation and the entry of many 
negotiation procedures. They inevitably enhance the discretionary powers of the 
contracting authorities and limit the operation of the principles of competition 
and sometimes also of transparency. In brief, they increase the risk of corruption 
in public procurement. The effect of raising the lower thresholds set out in the 
legislation is similar.
It is only understandable that the prevailing approach to the reduction and 
prevention of corruption in Bulgaria is the legislative one. In other words, 
economic efficiency is often neglected in order to close all real and perceived 
loopholes for abuse in the laws. These measures frequently fail to produce a 
greater effect than mere repair work of filling in gaps and imperfections in the 
legal framework – something which Bulgarian businesses are increasingly skeptical 
about. Moreover, the transposition of the European norms is only the beginning of 
the optimization of the legal framework. It is much more important and difficult 
to attain the European standards for their implementation. In this context, the 
enhanced quality of the legal framework does not end with the modernization 
of the law; it depends on its feasibility under the Bulgarian conditions. After 
the exhausting and often self-serving pre-accession marathon of harmonizing the 
national legislation with the acquis communautaire the confidence in the potential 
of the law is seriously eroded without the requisite reforms of the judiciary. It is 
generally recognized that the legal framework of public procurement in Bulgaria 
is almost fully harmonized with that of the European Union but corrupt practices 
become greater in scale, better streamlined, and less vulnerable. The number of 
skeptics is growing as to whether the law is capable of reducing corruption in 
the public procurement sphere. Bribery is very difficult to prove and, in many 
cases, there might be no procedural irregularities, i.e. the awarding of the public 
procurement contract to a pre-selected contractor might be formally lawful.
These constraints raise the issue of the other priorities of the anti-corruption 
policy in this sector. They are more or less external to the legal framework 
of public procurement but they are equally important for the attainment of a 
sustainable anti-corruption effect. They include the following:     
• financial control and accountability in the public sector;
• the efficiency of the judiciary;
• administrative capacity and the codes of conduct;
• the financing of political parties;
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• the regulation of lobbyism and conflicts of interests;
• the regulation of public-private partnerships;
• the declaration of the property and income of senior officials, etc.
Besides, it becomes ever more imperative to increase the share of economic 
analysis in the efforts to reduce and prevent corruption. Economic policies are 
usually reduced to the so-called “positive anti-corruption incentives”, such as the 
increase of salaries or party subsidies. However, these positive incentives can 
rarely reach the size and motivation potential of bribery in public procurement. 
It is more important to consider all internal (mainly the LPP and RSPP) and 
external sources of corruption risk in public procurement in their entirety and 
interaction from the viewpoint of costs and benefits for society and the economy. 
This implies an economic impact assessment of the various alternatives which are 
the focal point of the public debate today. These are, for instance, the questions 
whether regulation should cover even the smallest procurement or below a 
certain level they should be left to the discretion of administrative staff with all 
the subsequent risks. 
The competition among the suppliers of goods and services for the public 
sector certainly runs the risk of being restricted by the growing administrative 
discretionary powers in the selection process. But it could be restricted also 
where the administrative costs (i.e. the time and money that the company spends 
to take part in the tender) as excessively high as a percentage of the total price 
of the supply. If businesses have to allocate time and money to participate in 
tenders even for the smallest procurement contracts, then the participants would 
hardly be the most qualified ones. Their alternative costs for the sale of their 
products to the public sector will be higher than the sales costs on the free 
market. This means that the public sector will consume at prices that are higher 
than the market ones which does not comply with the public interest in achieving 
maximum economic efficiency.
The solution of the issue of the sectoral chambers of associations is not so 
straightforward as it seems to be in the public debate. Again, the point of 
departure should be the assessment of the extent to which they can really be 
better guarantors of free competition and public interests than the state. Each 
entrepreneur considers free competition as the most important condition to reach 
the customers and to purchase raw materials at beneficial prices. But does it 
mean that, once established on the market, the entrepreneur will not strive for 
maximum profit, i.e. for monopoly or oligopoly over the goods and services that 
he supplies? Can sectoral associations guarantee the broadest possible and equal 
access to public procurement? Provided that they represent only their members 
are there guarantees that their interests coincide with the public interest? Can 
sectoral associations really safeguard public interests better than civil servants 
given the fact that the latter are, after all, subject to greater civil control?
The question about the optimal balance between the procedure prescribed by law 
and the discretionary powers of the contracting authorities cannot have a single 
answer for all European countries and it can hardly be resolved by means of 
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harmonization of the legislation. Modern impact assessment techniques should be 
applied to the regulations, taking into account the specific national circumstances. 
In this case, they have to weigh the losses to society due to the additional 
corruption risk which depends also on the effectiveness of the administrative 
and judicial anti-corruption barriers, against the benefits derived from the greater 
freedom of the contracting authorities to negotiate the best terms and conditions. 
Pre-fixing and strictly following the parameters of the supply or service is not 
always feasible or beneficial on the market. Generally, the access to negotiation 
procedures, competitive dialogue and framework agreements calls for a certain 
level of efficiency of the risk management system and independence of internal 
and external control, courts and prosecution offices to provide these benefits to 
society by bringing contracting authorities in the public sector closer to normal 
market conditions.
There are many questions and they have not been answered either in theory or 
in international practice. Moreover, in the international context they are essential 
elements of the freedom of movement of goods, services and capital and of the 
anti-corruption efforts. New challenges emerge in the process of globalization, 
development of e-society and e-commerce. The identification of the optimal 
Bulgarian solutions is still an area in which politics is in debt to businesses. 

APPENDIX 1. LARGEST PUBLIC PROCUREMENT CONTRACTING
 AUTHORITIES IN TERMS OF AMOUNT OF THE   
 SIGNED CONTRACTS (10/2004 – 06/2006)
1 Republican Road Infrastructure Fund (former Roads Executive Agency) 52,227,072
2 Natioanl Electrical Company /NEC/ 47,586,833
3 Bulgarian State Railways /BDZ/ 22,278,637
4 Mines “Maritza Iztok” - Radnevo 19,942,572
5 State Agency “State Reserve and War-Time Stocks” 14,671,313
6 Ministry of Health /MH 14,046,849
7 ТMaritsa - East 2 TPP 13,051,728
8 Military Medical Academy 12,766,691
9 Ministry of Transport /МТ/ 12,206,323
10 Comnunications and ICT Development Agency 8,334,896
2004
1 Natioanl Electrical Company /NEC/ 7,917,898,045
2 Republican Road Infrastructure Fund (former Roads Executive Agency) 520,783,120
3 Sofia Municipality 236,068,966
4 Maritsa - East 2 TPP 177,022,991
5 Ministry of Health /MH/ 133,352,262
6 Military Medical Academy 133,196,172
7 Mines “Maritza Iztok” - Radnevo 126,984,335
8 State Agency “State Reserve and War-Time Stocks” 123,067,658
9 Ministry of Education and Science /MES/ 108,793,775
10 Bourgas Municipality 89,455,155
2005
 Source: Public Procurement Agency
1 Republican Road Infrastructure Fund (former Roads Executive Agency) 755,940,684
2 Maritsa - East 2 TPP 107,523,480
3 Port Infrastructure State Compnay 80,257,699 80,257,699
4 Natioanl Electrical Company /NEC/ 65,048,368
5 NPP Kozloduy 63,462,248
6 Varna Municipality 59,571,154
7 Ministry of Education and Science /MES/ 48,339,494
8 Sliven Municipality 37,490,931
9 Autotransport EAD 32,997,000
10 Mines “Maritza Iztok” - Radnevo 31,775,190
2006
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Total Value of 
Contracts (levs)
265 Marista-East Mines EAD, Radnevo 195 166 177,856,575
235 Bobov Dol Mines EAD 78 67 11,077,706
592 Zdravets Mine EAD (in liquidation), Dimitrovgrad 4 2 10,899,944
552 Causto-Gold AD, Kyustendil 8 25 5,302,896
758 Briquelle EAD, Gulubovo 6 5 3,796,559
836 Maritsa Basin Mine EOOD (in liquidation) 5 5 1,485,216
1082 Ivan Rusev Mine EOOD, Zhitusha (in liquidation) 1 1 750,332
681 Pernik Mines EAD (in liquidation) 1 1 84,037
682 Colosh-BD EOOD, Bobov Dol 1 0 0
323 Pirin Mine EAD, Simitli 3 0 0
Coal or other solid fuels
43 The available data cover the period 01.10.2004 - 30.06.2006
Batch 
No.





Total Value of 
Contracts (levs).
123 Varna TPP EAD, Ezerovo 77 82 54,403,886
428 Bulgargas EAD 134 144 38,757,136
217 Bobov Dol TPP 89 91 27,148,856
678 District Heating – Russe EAD 29 23 9,098,695
277 District Heating – Sofia AD 38 27 8,031,011
305 District Heating –Pernik EAD 15 28 7,626,402
129 District Heating –Plovdiv EAD 32 27 3,023,155
633 Sevlievogas-2000 AD, Sevlievo 2 2 1,846,521
967 Balkangas 2000 AD 1 1 125,950
1086 District Heating – Vratsa EAD 1 1 100,000
198 District Heating –Sliven EAD 14 1 61,200
1184 District Heating –Shumen EAD 1 1 33,578
375 District Heating –Pleven EAD 5 0 0









Total Value of 
Contracts (levs).
926 LUKOIL Neftochim Burgas AD 6 4 14,230,677
1123 Prospecting and Extracting oil and gas AD, Sofia 5 5 8,230,840
Oil and natural gas
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Batch 
No.





Total Value of 
Contracts (levs).
26 National Electric Company (NEC) EAD 209 208 7,975,438,347
246 Maritsa-East 2 TPP EAD 300 377 297,598,200
353 Kozlodui NPP EAD 322 326 139,673,269
15 Maritsa-East 3 Energy Company (EC) AD 229 272 105,738,588
609 Electric Distribution – Gorna Oryahovitsa AD 36 58 38,633,244
26 NEC EAD – High Voltage Networks Enterprise 
(HVNE)
91 92 33,644,654
143 EVN Bulgaria Electric Distribution AD, Plovdiv (former 
name Electric Distribution Plovdiv AD)
42 41 27,298,039
922 EVN Bulgaria Electric Distribution – Plovdiv (former 
name Electric Distribution – Stara Zagora AD)
35 41 26,413,695
225 Electric Distribution – Varna EAD 42 39 23,252,723
695 Electric Distribution – Sofia City EAD, 
Electric Distribution – Sofia Region AD, 
Electric Distribution – Pleven AD
25 27 12,603,896
26 NEC EAD – Dams and Cascades Enterprise 11 9 3,328,695
26 NEC EAD – Trafoelectroinvest Enterprise 11 8 2,854,562
924 Electric Distribution – Pleven AD 4 13 2,679,472
542 Electric Distribution – Sofia City EAD 4 2 2,536,100
26 NEC EAD – Hydro Power Plants – Rila Group) 
Enterprise (Rila Group HPP)
12 11 1,653,512
155 Electric Distribution – Sofia Region AD 4 3 1,055,845
26 NEC EAD – Belene NPP Branch 4 2 480,020
992 Energo-pro Bulgaria AD 3 0 0
460 Maritsa 3 TPP AD, Dimitrovgrad 1 1 0
1066 Maritsa-East 2 TPP EAD, Maritsa-East 3 




APPENDIX 3. WHO IS WHO ON THE BULGARIAN ENERGY   
 MARKET?
FRONTIER
It was registered in Sofia in 1994 under the name Frontier 7 and it was 
subsequently renamed into Frontier. It is owned by Krassimir Georgiev, Edward 
Manoukian and Georgi Sotirov (through their company Metaconsult BG EOOD, 
renamed into Euronex in December 2006). The business interests of the company 
lie mainly in the energy sector: Maritsa-East site, supplies of nuclear fuel to 
Kozlodui NPP, Tsankov Kamuk HPP and the Lower Arda Cascade, Yadenitsa dam, 
and consultancy related to Belene NPP. Frontier was the consultant of Entergy 
and Enel in their transaction for the rehabilitation of Maritsa-East 3 TPP at the 
value of $600 million. The owners of Frontier have taken over several hydro 
power plants: Bor, Iglika, Zdravets, Elenov Dol, Yassen, Slubeshka, Lilia, Kositsa.
Frontier became known to the wider public in 2004 because of its participation 
with 49% in the mega-project Burgas Universal Terminal (BUT), where the 
majority shareholder of 51% is Technoexportstroy. The idea is to have BUT build 
and operate the infrastructure at the point of entry of the two oil pipelines from 
Burgas to Alexandroupolis in Greece and to Vlora in Albania. Initially, BUT was 
subscribed with 75 %, together with Bulgargas, in the Burgas-Alexandroupolis 
Oil Pipeline International Project Company (IPC). Later on, the ownership of IPC 
which holds the entry terminal of the oil pipeline in Burgas was distributed in 
51:49 ratio between Russia and Bulgaria. The Russian share belongs to Transneft, 
Rosneft and Gasprom Neft, while the Bulgarian share is distributed equally 
(24.5% each) between Technoexportstroy and Bulgargas. Frontier was removed 
from participation at the point of entry of the oil pipeline.
Over the years, related to Frontier through their owners have been the following 
companies: DMC Interactive OOD (where Krassimir Georgiev is a partner); TT 
Multra Trading Team, Dusseldorf; Microprocessor Systems, Pravets; the companies 
in the 7M Group (currency exchange offices with the participation of Georgi 
Sotirov); 7M Insurance and Reinsurance Company; 7M Life; Fontier Finance AD 
– investment intermediary; Bulinvest Group; Demax Print; Easypack, etc. 
The group has interests in real estate and tourism. Georgi Sotirov and Krassimir 
Georgiev jointly manage Bansko Property Partners, in the second version of which 
(Bansko Property Partners 2) Krassimir Georgiev was a partner of Tsetsa Stancheva, 
mother of the former Executive Director of the district heating company in Sofia 
Valentin Dimitrov until the middle of 2006.
The companies in the group have some points of intersection with other corporate 
groups in the energy sector. For instance, Krassimir Georgiev is a partner of 
Bogomil Manchev (Risk Engineering) in the company whose objects include TV 
and radio broadcasting equipment and conductor communications equipment. 
This is CMC, where 33% belong to Risk Engineering, 33 % to Frontier, and 33 % 
to Grozdan Dobrev.
The prosecution completed its investigation of Frontier in April 2007, which found 
out no violations, and ruled that there was no evidence of the commission of 
an offence.
RISK ENGINEERING 
It was considered to be the most influential corporate group in the energy sector 
over the period 1997 – 2005. Owner of 60 % of Risk Engineering is Bogomil 
Manchev who is a nuclear engineer. He is also a shareholder in the following 
companies: SCES (30 %), Fisk Consult (33 %), Perennia (50 %), Risk Engineering-
D (6.806 %), Nova Soft Technology (17 %), Bulgarian Energy (50 %). He 
participates in the management of Risk Engineering, Ters Moshino, Risk Power, 
Risk Engineering-F, Risk Engineering-D, GCR, Risk Engineering AD, Transimpex, 
the Bulgagrian Nuclear Forum Association, and the Consortium for Sustainable 
Energy Development.
The group around Risk Engineering holds the largest percentage of the supplies 
of goods and services to the Bulgarian energy sector. The company features in 
the Public Procurement Register as the supplier of spare parts for thermal power 
plants, the contractor for the safety check of the nuclear units in Kozlodui 
NPP, consultant engineer (or architect engineer) of projects for the building, 
refurbishment and rehabilitation of power plants (e.g. Maritsa-East 2 TPP), etc. 
It has also implemented contracts beyond the scope of the LPP, hence outside 
the Public Procurement Register. Specially for the construction of Belene NPP 
Risk Engineering, in consortium with the European branch of the U.S. company 
parsons, has been appointed by NEC as the architect engineer of the project 
without any competitive procedure under the LPP due to its unique expertise in 
the sector. Their joint venture GCR OOD will be the supervisor of all construction 
works. The declared value of the service ranges between €300 million and €400 
million, depending on the future contract with the contracting authority NEC 
and the contractor Atomstroyexport. Initial estimates point to €3.997 billion for 
the construction of Belence NPP according to the bid of the Russian company. 
This amount reaches €5 billion with the interest accrued on the loans or 
more than €6 billion with the construction of the infrastructure facilities on 
the site and the improvements of the electric system. The commitment of 
the Russian side is to have at least 30 % of the resources to be allocated to 
Bulgarian subcontractors. This means at least €1.2 billion in the form of contracts 
awarded to Bulgarian companies in the next eight years. It will cover five main 
areas: engineering services, construction works, assembly and installation works, 
supplies, and adjustment of the systems. The involvement of subcontractors like 
Glavbolgarstroy, Minstroy Holding, Enemona, Atomenergoremont and others has 
already been announced and the list is not final. No formal public procurement 
procedures are envisaged for the selection of subcontractors.
GCR OOD is owned by Risk Engineering (51 %) and the U.S. company Gilbert 
Commonwealth International (49 %) which was acquired by Parsons Engineers & 
Constructors in 1995. The company is registered at the address of Risk Engineering. 
Managers of GCR are Mogomil Manchev, Djurica Tankosic and the U.S. citizen 
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Robert Vaugn. The latter is vice-president of Parsons for business development in 
Europe, the former Soviet republics and Parsons Group International Limited. 
PARSONS BULGARIA
Parsons E & C Bulgaria is registered at the address of Risk Engineering. It is 100 % 
owned by the British company Parsons E & C Europe Limited and managed by 
Djurica Tankosic. Tankosic has experience in the nuclear power plants of former 
Yugoslavia (Slovenia and Serbia) and in the United States. He came to Bulgaria in 
1994 and did the first feasibility study for the district heating company of Sofia. 
Parsons E & C Bulgaria is a consultant to Kozlodui NPP for the project concerning 
the modernization of units 5 and 6. The company is the engineer consultant for 
the rehabilitation of Maritsa-East 2 TPP (Risk Engineering is the subcontractor) 
and architect engineer of the Belene NPP project. Parsons E & C Bulgaria EOOD 
has recently been selected as a consultant to the project for the construction of 
Mohovce NPP.
At the end of 2004 it was officially announced that the control of Parsons E & 
C Europe Limited had been taken over by Worley Group Limited and hence 
it already operated under the name Worley Parsons. The subdivision of Worley 
Parsons in London is named WorleyParsons Europe Ltd. Its places of operation 
include the United Kingdom, as well as the former Soviet republics, the Middle 
East, South-East Asia and Australia. So far Parsons E & C Europe Ltd. Has been 
commissioned the feasibility study for the construction of Belene NPP and the 
environmental impact assessment at the value of $7.7 million and the activities 
of an architect engineer (technical consultant) to NEC EAD for the same project 
at the value of €18.99 million per annum.
ATOMENERGOREMONT
The company was established in 1974 for the repair and maintenance of the 
facilities at Kozlodui NPP. In 1978, it began to manufacture spare parts, units 
and equipment and to perform on-site repair of energy facilities, as well as to 
provide services and to perform construction works. In 2001, Atomenergoremont 
repair enterprise was transformed into a state-owned single-member shareholding 
company. On 27 October 2003, after the privatization procedure was completed, 
Atomenergoremont EAD was transformed into Atomenergoremont AD, where the 
major shareholder is the Bulgarian Energy Company EOOD owned by Hristo 
Kovachki. Atomenergoremont EAD carries out current repair works and overhaul 
at Kozlodui NPP and it is also involved directly in the reconstruction and 
modernization of the energy units of the nuclear power plant. It provides some 
repair services to Vidin TPP, Maritsa-East 2 TPP. The company manufactures and 
repairs spare parts, metal structures, heat exchangers, high-voltage engines, heat 
insulation and other equipment for Bulgarian and foreign companies.  
Hristo Kovachki owns or controls several hydro power plants, the only briquette 
factory in Bulgaria – Briquelle, the district heating company in Pleven, the tire 
processing factory in Gaber, and the Europa chain of stores. Kovachki himself 
claims that he is only a consultant for most of the projects but he points out 
in interviews that he is the employer of over five thousand people. Companies 
from the group hold 26 %of the Municipal Bank AD and 20 % of the Municipal 
Insurance Company AD.
MINSTROY HOLDING – BULGARIAN ECO PROJECTS
Minstroy Holding AD is a subcontractor in the Belene project. The main figure in 
the company is Nikolai Valkanov, former director of the Mining Research Institute 
and then director general of the state-owned company Minstroy Holding. Until 
October 2003 he was a member of the Managing Board of Multigroup and in 
2005 he became a member of the managing board of Chimimport AD, Sofia. 
Some years ago, Minstroy Holding was a company through which Multigroup 
exercised control over more than 13 companies and was a minority shareholder 
in several others such as Balkanstory, United Energy Systems, Energy 94, Eurola, 
Ares Petrol, Geotechno Engineering, etc.
In 2004, Minstroy was taken over by Bulgarian Eco Projects which currently 
holds 86% of Minstroy Holding. Since April 2004 Minstroy has been the main 
contractor of the construction of Tsankov Kamuk hydro power facilities with the 
financial support of Alpine Meireder. According to the trade registers, the Austrian 
company holds 51 % of Alpine Bulgaria and the other 49 % belong to Bulgarian 
Eco Projects which, in turn, owns 86 % of Minstroy Holding. The Council of 
Ministers adopted Decision No. 592 of 2 September 2003 to select the National 
Electric Company as the contractor for the project. The financing includes an 
export loan of €100 million and a commercial loan of €120 million provided 
by Austrian and other European banks. In 2006, Minstroy Holding obtained 
a permit to prospect and to operate deposits of oil, coal and rock materials. 
The involvement of Minstroy Holding in the construction of Belene NPP was 
announced in October of the same year.
90 APPENDIX 3
CSD REPORTS:
 1. Bulgaria’s Participation in EU Structural Funds, Sofia, 1999.
  ISBN 954-477-050-8
 2. Social Policy Aspects of Bulgaria’s EU Accession, Sofia, 1999.
  ISBN 954-477-053-4
 3. Preparing for EU Accession Negotiations, Sofia, 1999.
  ISBN 954-477-055-7
 4. The Role of Political Parties in Accession to the EU, Sofia, 1999.
  ISBN 954-477-055-0
 5. Bulgaria’s Capital Markets in the Context of EU Accession: A Status Report, Sofia, 1999.
  ISBN 954-477-059-3
 6. Corruption and Trafficking: Monitoring and Prevention, Sofia, 2000.
  ISBN 954-477-078-X
 7. Establishing Corporate Governance in an Emerging Market: Bulgaria, Sofia, 2000. 
  ISBN 954-477-084-4
 9. Corruption and Illegal Trafficking: Monitoring and Prevention, Second, revised and 
  amended edition, Sofia, 2000.
  ISBN 954-477-087-9
 10. Smuggling in Southeast Europe, Sofia, 2002.
  ISBN 954-477-099-2
 11. Corruption, Trafficking and Institutional Reform, Sofia, 2002.
  ISBN 954-477-101-8
 12. The Drug Market in Bulgaria, Sofia, 2003.
  ISBN 954-477-111-5
 13. Partners in Crime: The Risks of Symbiosis between the Security Sector and 
  Organized Crime in Southeast Europe, Sofia, 2004. 
  ISBN 954-477-115-8
 14. Weapons under Scrutiny: Implementing Arms Export Controls and Combating Small Arms 
  Proliferation in Bulgaria, Sofia, 2004.
  ISBN 954-477-117-470
 15. Transportation, Smuggling and Organized Crime, Sofia, 2004.
  ISBN 954-477-119-0
 16. Corruption and Tax Compliance. Challenges to Tax Policy and Administration, Sofia, 2005. 
  ISBN 954-477-132-8
 17. Police Stops and Ethnic Profiling in Bulgaria, Sofia, 2006. 
  ISBN-10 954-477-142-5
  ISBN-13 978-954-477-142-3            
18. Corruption in Public Procurement. Risks and Reform Policies, 2007.
  ISBN-987-954-477-149-2
Editorial Board
  Ognian Shentov
  Boyko Todorov
  Alexander Stoyanov
 ISBN-987-954-477-149-2
©  2007 Center for the Study of Democracy
  All rights reserved.
  5 Alexander Zhendov Str. 1113 Sofia
  phone: (+359 2) 971 3000
  fax: (+359 2) 971 2233
  www.csd.bg
  csd@online.bg
